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ABSTRACT
This research presents an analysis of the economic, technical and
political inputs to the decision-making process of the Agency for
International Development (AID) in the area of urban development. The
historical development of AID's urban policy is traced and the various
external political and economic inputs to the AID decision-making
process are examined.
In order to perform this analysis, the case study of Egypt was chosen.
The National Urban Policy Study for Egypt, completed in 1982, is
compared to AID's urban strategy for Egypt to determine the manner in
which AID utilizes technical inputs in its decision-making process. The
relationship among the United States Government, Egyptian Government,
and the technical contractor is described and suggestions for future
improvements are provided.
Conclusions state that AID'S economic development objectives are often
secondary to its political ones, due to its use as an instrument of
foreign policy as well. However, given the political framework within
which the Agency must operate, the author also concludes that AID is
still able to meet significant development objectives.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Ralph Gakenheimer
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning and
Civil Engineering
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INTRODUCTION
The task of understanding the theoretical basis upon which
decisions are made in bureaucratic agencies is perhaps tedious, but not
difficult. However, the comparison of a set of actual decisions to that
theoretical model presents a much greater challenge, especially if there
is a significant disparity between the decisions that one would have
expected and those that actually were made. It is the explanation of
this disparity that is the objective of this research.
The Agency for International Development (AID) is the primary
United States foreign economic assistance agency. Headquartered in
Washington, D.C., it has over forty field missions throughout the
developing world where development specialists in many technical areas
implement the U.S. economic assistance program. AID is very similar to
other U.S. government agencies in that it has its regulations,
procedures, proponents and opponents, but it has additional dimensions
which set it apart from most other agencies--the necessity to work with
foreign governments to meet its objectives and the lack of an American
consti tuency.
I have chosen to examine the decision-making process with regard to
AID's urban development program because it not only is characteristic of
the Agency's decision-making process as a whole, but also is becoming
more and more important to the Agency's overall development policy as
low-income countries become increasingly urbanized. In addition, since
AID is currently revising its urban policy statement, I believe this to
be a propitious time for closer examination of the existing decision-
making process.
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Before examining the decision-making process itself, I will
analyze the historical evolution of AID's urban policy and how it
relates to other sectors of assistance. I will then proceed to the
theoretical model of how AID's decision-making process takes place.
This description will include an analysis of the technical, economic and
political inputs to the process and, especially, the external forces and
requirements which influence the Agency as it seeks to carry out its
objectives.
After an estrangement of approximately two decades, Egypt's
relationship with the United States began to thaw in 1974 with the
introduction of President Sadat's Open Door Policy. By 1975, a small
AID Mission opened in Cairo, which by 1984, numbered over 120 Americans
and $1.0 billion per year, making it the largest AID Mission in the
world. The signing of the Camp David Agreement in 1979 further
strengthened the relationship and positioned AID as the largest
international donor in Egypt.
It was in 1980 that the Egyptian government sought assistance from
AID and the World Bank in funding of its New Towns Policy. That policy,
which congealed in the early 1970's called for establishing desert
cities in remote areas of the country for populations which desired the
amenities of life in urban environments. Development of these cities
would conserve the arable lands outside of Cairo that were being
urbanized as the capital's urban sprawl proceeded at an alarming rate,
and serve to deconcentrate populations in the Cairo and Alexandria
Metropolitan regions. Remote area cities would need great amounts of
infrastructure investment such as housing, water, and electricity, if
the large-scale economic activities that would attract significant
ii
populations to these cities was to be realized.
As is usually the case when AID is asked to finance projects in an
area in which it has not previously worked, AID requested that a study
be undertaken. The Egyptian government agreed and PADCO, an American
contractor, was hired to perform the National Urban Policy Study (NUPS).
The NUPS study later was to form the basis upon which AID would
formulate the urban development portion of the fiscal year 1984 Country
Development Strategy Statement (CDSS), the Agency's statement of
development strategy for Egypt.
The NUPS study was published in 1982 but has never been officially
accepted by the government of Egypt. Subsequent to the study's
publication, AID has made significant financial commitments to Egypt in
the urban area which do not, to a great extent, reflect the extensive
recommendations offered by the NUPS. The comparison between the
theoretical base the study was to have provided and what is, in
practice, AID's urban development policy, can be best portrayed by
comparing the substantive areas of the NUPS report with AID's CDSS Urban
Strategy Update for Egypt, in order to determine the extent to which the
technical report was utilized in the decision-making process.
The Egyptian case is interesting in that the U.S. Government's
relationship with that country is a special one; however; it is my
perception that the manner in which decisions were made in the case of
Egypt does not differ significantly from the decision-making process
for other countries in which AID finances development programs. The
fact of Egypt's strategic importance to the U.S. is important in the
decision-making process, but such strategic considerations form part of
the process with regard to all countries, making the Egypt case a valid
iii
one from which to draw some general conclusions.
I have observed that there is very little written in or outside of
AID as to how and/or why development decisions often differ
significantly from the technical inputs upon which they are supposed to
be based. Of course, there are significant external forces which shape
these technical inputs are placed, resulting in decisions which differ
from that which one might otherwise expect. To what extent do exterior
concerns affect the "technical logic" in decision-making is the central
concern of this thesis. This study is based on: (i) my search of AID
and NUPS documents; (ii) the relatively small body of literature on
this aspect of the decision-making process; and (iii) a series of
interviews I have had with AID officials and NUPS participants. Using
the NUPS as control study, I wil l examine the impact of external
pressures on AID, in terms of technical and political choices the Agency
has made in the formulation of urban policy for Egypt.
As a result of my research, I have come to certain conclusions
regarding the level of AID's autonomy in its decision-making process.
These conclusions lead to my recommendations as to how the Agency might
have greater influence on the inputs to the decision-making process, as
well as the future directions those inputs might take. Finally, I will
seek to assess this case's similarities to AID programs in other sectors
as well as other countries, in order to generalize my conclusions and
recommendations.
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CHAPTER I
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT'S
URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY
The United States Agency for International Development and its
predecessor agencies since the Marshall Plan following World War II,
have selected various sectors in which to concentrate their resources
for economic assistance to developing countries. It was not until 1970
that an urban development staff became a reality for AID and, with it,
the inevitable problem of defining what it was that urban development
was really dealing with.
AID's sector approach to economic development historically has
sought key issues and critical problems to target for assistance. The
process of urbanization, however, was unlike agriculture, health or
education in that it was not a single problem with a set of possible
actions from which to choose; rather, a more comprehensive approach was
needed. In an effort to define that approach, the new urban development
staff defined two sets of urban development problem areas: those
related to the dynamics of the process and those that were more
"practical" in nature.1
The first problem area was concerned with policy approaches
fundamental to urbanization, while the second related to projects such
as housing or water supply which would contribute to urban development,
especially as it influences national economic development. It is
interesting to note the categorization of these issues in this, the
Agency's first attempt at defining the urban pol icy which had been
enunciated in 1966.
The following indicates the level at which the debate on urban-
rural issues was held. These issues on dynamics are still familiar ones
which, for the most part, have not been resolved twenty years later.
(1) Growth - Is growth of the urban sector an incentive
and/or a constraint to socio-economic development?
(2) Determinants of Growth - Is the principle determinant
of urban growth that natural rate of population
increase or the rate of rural-urban migration?
(3) Distribution of Growth - Does rural-urban migration of
population and exchange of resources between urban and
rural areas meet the requirements of a growth
population, especially in the urban sector? How can
an imbalance be avoided, particularly if the rural
population continues to grow in absolute terms?
(4) Structural Patterns of Growth - To what extent is the
primate city form an optimal urban pattern for
national development? To what extent does it function
al so as a hindrance to more balanced and efficient
growth?
(5) Consequences of Growth - Are slum and squatter
settlements "cancerous blights" to be eliminated as a
matter of urgency for both humane and practical
reasons? Do they play a positive role in aiding
people in the complex process of adaptation to a
modern way of life?
(6) Management of Growth - What are the roots of the
dissonance between comprehensive, well-integrated
development plans and their coordinated, often
irrational implementation? How can this dissonace be
overcome?
(7) Structure of the Urban System - Is there a city-size
distribution or a spatial distribution of urban
centers that is more efficient 2than others for given
levels of national development?
The Agency focussed its attention on these issues and proposed
various options which could be taken to deal with them. However, it was
with the short-run practical problems which AID had been solving for
rural populations that it felt most comfortable. These day-to-day
implementation problems were rather clear and not open to many different
interpretations as to how they could be solved:
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(1) Skilled Manpower - Shortages in particular skills
required for conceptualization, planning and
implementation of urban development.
(2) Application of Scientific Knowledge and Technological
Innovations - The latest scientific knowledge and
technological innovations to areas, including
environmental pollution, ecological balance, mass
transportation, waste disposal, basic education,
communications, power, housing, employment, should be
incorporated into the planning and implementation
process.
(3) Use of Improved Techniques and Approaches for
Decision-Making - Cost/benefit analyses and pricing,
land-use analyses, data generation, screening and
storage, information feedback systems, establishment
of realistic and appropriate standards, etc., all
influence the allocation of resources, the spatial
distribution of people and the quality of human life.
(4) New Modes of Analysis - Where conventional analytical
approaches are inadequate, such as for growth center
analysis, urban growth component and new town
analysis, new modes of analysis must be applied.
(5) Socio-economic Inputs in Planning - Due to socio-
political problems and a desire for more equitable
distribution of resources, more attention needs to be
focussed on urban problems in the planning process:
unemployment, marginal elements, urban education.
(6) Service System - Need for development of service
systems which are integral parts of and compatible
with urban development and national developmentg i.e.
transportation, administration, health delivery.
This list implies that many of these areas, not specifically part
of AID's urban projects, were not having an impact upon other projects.
On the contrary, though before 1970 there were no projects developed
solely with urban people as beneficiaries, many other non-urban projects
had quite an impact upon them. Though not termed "urban," the 145
technical assistance projects, amounting to $58.0 million, plus capital
assistance projects in urban potable water alone ran to $40.0 million.
(See Annex 1 for projects from 1949-1970).4
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These ad hoc efforts initially included an emphasis upon building
materials, followed by the self-help concepts of the 1950's. 5  The
following decade saw activity in sectors such as transportation, health,
and industry, which, though not then defined as urban, were certainly
urban in location.
Growing from its interest in housing assistance, AID's broader view
of housing in a total environmental context began to appear first in the
Latin America Bureau in the 1960's. It was in this region that the
problems of urbanization first became prevalent due to Latin American's
rapid development that provided the Agency with fertile ground for new
projects of this type. Traditional sector projects also addressed
political, social and economic issues in the urban area: slums and
squatter settlements; employment generation; and administrative
bottlenecks to project implementation. 6  Municipal development projects
(some with histories dating back as far as 1952) dealt with the very
same issues with which AID and other international donor agencies are
now grappling and calling "decentralization:" strengthening of local
government associations; training local government officials; improving
local government finances; expanding local government services; and
developing a concern for area planning. These issues of
decentralization will be examined further in the context of the Egypt
Nationdl Urban Policy case study in Chapter III.
Technical assistance to less developed countries' (LDC) savings and
loan associations for institution building purposes soon complemented
AID housing loans. Assistance was obtained from such organizations as
The Housing and Home Finance Agency, The Foundation for Cooperative
Housing, The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, The National League of
4
Insured Savings, The American Savings and Loan Institute and others. 7
Although technical assistance projects to build up savings and loan
associations (S & L's) functioned well, the fact remained, that mostly
upper and, less frequently, middle income groups had access to loan
funds. Since high down payments, collateral, tenure requirements, and
necessity of regular income, all made it difficult for the lowest income
groups to benefit from such technical assistance, only certain levels of
middle income groups benefited from these projects. Technical
assistance also took the shape of resident AID technicians and
consultants, workshops on squatters settlements and site planning,
participant training and commodity purchases. 8
The problems associated with developing urban plans at that point
in AID's history seemed to have moved toward solution. However, with
the abundance of advisors being contracted and plans being produced, the
successful implementation of those plans was still the essence of urban
development and, according to Cooley, there were still some problems in
taking that final step in the process from plans to reality.9 The
importance of a comprehensive, cross-sectoral approach in urban
development was realized, but it was the infrastructure, the nuts and
bolts projects, that were being emphasized right up until the 1970's
since AID development experts' lack of know-how on how to approach the
urban policy area in a coordinated fashion was still evident, and the
research which they and the World Bank, among others, would undertake on
the subject had not as yet begun.
The 1973 United States Congressional mandate to AID directed the
Agency to focus on the "poor majority," an effort targeted to the poor
population in developing countries, rather than a continuation of the
5
"trickle down" theory that the generalized improvement in economic
conditions in a country, in fact, would "trickle down" to the poor.
Three major areas: health and population, agriculture, and education,
were to be the Agency's priorities and remain so until today. After
careful study, the Congress had come to the conclusion that development
based on the "trickle down" theory had not reached the majority of the
poor people of the Third World.
AID's interpretation of this mandate was that it was to focus on
the poor majority residing in rural areas in the LDC's. Since Agency
policy was to deal primarily with the productive aspects of development,
a shift in emphasis to the urban poor might divert resources to welfare-
related activities. What's more, rural populations, for the most part,
exceeded urban populations in sheer numbers, so that the stress upon
rural areas seemed all too warranted.
Until the late 1960's, the above-mentioned "trickle down" theory
was popular with most international donors, with a special emphasis upon
maximizing aggregate agricultural output, as well as overall economic
health of developing countries. The kinds of technologies being
transferred, were increasing both absolute and relative income
disparities among farmers in developing countries. 1 0
The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) amendments in 1973 stated:
United States bilateral development assistance should give
the highest priority to undertakings submitted by host
governments which directly improve the lives of the poorest
of their people and their capacity to participate in the
development of their countries.
... greatest emphasis should be placed on countries and
activities which effectively involve the poor in
development, by expanding their access to the economy
through services and institutions at the local level,
increasing labor-intensive production, spreading productive
investment and services out from major cities to small
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towns and outlying rural areas, and otherwise providing
opportunities for lhe poor to better their lives through
their own efforts.
Notwithstanding the Act, from a policy perspective, whether rural
development programs were designed to be doing so or not, they were
providing assistance to urban poor; urban-dwellers were receiving AID's
largesse in market towns, in small cities and elsewhere. The Housing
Investment Guaranty (HG) program since the early 1960's, had authorized
almost $1.0 billion for shelter-related projects, all in urban areas.
"Poor" people were classified as those who earned less than $150/year
per capita and had a diet of 2200 calories per day or less. There were
those in the urban areas who more than qualified, since an adjustment in
income would be necessary to compensate for the difference in food costs
of the urban poor due to distances from the source. More importantly,
simultaneously with this internal policy struggle on how to reach the
poor, though urban population, came an increased rate of urbanization, a
rural-urban migration, which served to point up the necessity for
examining rural and urban development problems together and for
developing programs in the context of an entire economy's development
problems.
Since the Foreign Assistant Act of December 1973 stipulated that HG
loans be coordinated with and complementary to other AID programs,
services such as power, water, and sewer lines have been added to AID's
Office of Housing and Urban Programs. Projects directed at families
below the median income in their respective areas have been broadened to
cover basic slum and squatter settlements as well as sites and
services.12 That shift in shelter emphasis was not initially very well-
received by host governments. When accepted, the preferred sites for
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such projects were capital cities or large metropolitan centers, which
only exacerbated the existing problem of urban overcrowding. 1 3 Most
governments did not want to admit to being able to provide only slum
upgrading and sites and services projects, consisting of small plots of
land, possibly with either core units and bathrooms and other services.
Single family homes and public housing were found to be too costly,
providing housing for only the upper and middle class population. Slum
clearance policies had only reduced the housing stock and caused other
slums to spring up elsewhere in the cities. The implementation problems
involved in upgrading and sites and services projects were many, but
with few resources, these innovative projects which, after all, were a
formalization of the activities already being undertaken by the LDC
populations, themselves, seemed to be the only answer.
Still, there was a growing need to reach a larger number of the
urban poor and it was determined that the Agency would:
In FY 1977, a) Accelerate implementation of present policy
regarding the off-farm aspects of rural
development, including a number of countries
where (AID) mission initiatives are already
underway;
b) Begin or accelerate field project identifi-
cation of analytic and pilot projects
(including HG and PL 480) dealing with the poor
majority in a few cities; and
c) Discuss our plans with Congress now and, if
necesary, ask for additional resources for FY
1978.
In FY 1978, begin f I!Vding pilot projects and analytical
efforts.
This new effort, in a way, was the initial attempt to relate urban
and rural development problems, analyze them together, and increase LDC
institutional capability to do the same, but backed by financial
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resources. In addition, specialists in urban develoment were beginning
to appear in AID's field missions, showing a new level of commitment to
the urban poor by the Agency.
With the passage of over a decade since Congress' poor majority
mandate to AID was redefined by the Agency to include assistance to
urban poor as well as rural poor, the Agency is again redefining its
framework for urban policy. The August 1984, "Draft Urban Development
Policy" defines "urban" as spatial in nature and "urban sector" as
including: "...the analytical, institutional, policy and related
aspects of urban development which normally would not be i ncuded in
describing traditional development sectors".15
Since every country defines differently what constitutes an urban
area, AID has chosen urban to mean "any separately administered
population agglomeration in which at least two-thirds of the households
derive their income from economic activities other than farming." 1 6  It
will be incumbent upon AID to determine which countries lend themselves
more to urban projects, given that "urban" is different for each
country. For example, those countries suffering from extreme land
pressures or those having to move to a more industrialized economy due
to the onset of drought conditions would be prime candidates for urban
over rural-oriented projects. Investments in shelter, infrastructure
and social services would be provided to locations where there are
sufficient productive investments in industry, commerce, and job
creation, which AID might also support. The former would be supplied at
appropriate standards, affordable and accessible to the poor.
The evolution of AID's concern for urban dwellers followed the
rate of rural-urban migration trends, beginning slowly in the fifties,
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but steadily increasing through the sixties and early seventies. By the
mid-seventies and up to the present, the tremendous rate of
urbanization, and projections that by the year 2000 most of the world
will live in urban areas, have provided AID with ample reason to take a
proactive rather than a reactive stance toward urban development. The
urban policy and programs to implement that policy have as their
objective the balance between urban and rural economic growth for
overall national economic development.
The benefits of urbanization and industrialization are offset by
the excess demand for services such as housing, water, health care, and
sewerage, and the increasing need for employment opportunities. AID's
current thinking, which can be linked to the Reagan Administration's
free market orientation, is to assist LDC governments in removing
distortions in their policies, such as subsidies on services,
interference in the labor markets, and disincentives to agricultural
producers through price controls. If such goal s can be met, then the
contribution of urbanization to total national economic growth may be
maximized. 1 8
The latest urban policy statement moves toward examining urban
centers, their consumption of resources, and how they fit into the
national economy and national settlement system. To support this
policy, AID counts the following among the types of urban programming it
might pursue:
1. Support for Country Economic Develoment Policies:
Aside from those mentioned above, AID would seek to
assist LDC governments in reversing policies which
suppress returns to the traditional rural sector in
order to:
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(a) achieve artificial cost-of-living reductions for
urban populations; or
(b) artificially manipulate returns in favor of speci-
fic interest groups in urban areas.
2. Support for the Private Sector and Job Creation:
Programs to include improvements of local credit insti-
tutions, possibly cooperative efforts among small-scale
enterprises which might decrease the transaction costs
of lending; assistance to local administrations in
removing administrative and regulatory constraints on
smal ler enterprises such as local tax and
administrative reform; creation of increased
opportunities for private participation in urban
development, including the provision of urban services
and those activities supportive of agricultural and
rural enterprise.
3. Support for Housing Policies and Programs for the Urban
Poor:
By introducing innovative techniques for low-cost
housing (sites and services and settlement upgrading
programs), and encouraging governments to lower
standards to levels that are affordable by the poor,
the HG program could assist in reducing housing
subsidies, thereby turning over low-cost housing
finance and construction to the private sector. AID
policy preference to avoid subsidies is clear in this
regard, though assistance will suport solving problems
which are not adequately addressed through private
organizations (e.g., disease prevention and the
improvement of health conditions through the provision
of water and sanitation facilities and services.)
4. Support for Development of Human Resources:
Activities to improve the productivity, efficiency and
capacity of human resources may be appropriate for
achieving the objectives of the urban development
strategy. Such programs may include: education,
health, nutrition, family planning and vocational
training.
5. Support for Urban Institutional Development:
The success of LDC's in the urban arena will depend
upon their capacity to develop, plan, manage and
deliver urban services. AID activities can assist
LDC's in planning the maximum utilization of both human
and capital resources; to improve institutional
efficiency in planning and provision of services,
including improved methods of cost recovery through
appropriately structured user charges and equitably
administered taxes; and to strengthen institutional
capacity through training programs.
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6. Support for Hazard Resistant Codes:
The increasing tendency for national and local
governments to allow development in areas prone to high
risk from natural disasters, particularly flood, severe
storm and earthquake, not only places lives in jeopardy
but also multiplies the potential for economic loss.
AID assistance should encourage settlement and building
regulations which will increase the survival raleg of
buildings and populations in disaster prone areas.
Though AID has come a long way from its early policy orientation,
which was to concentrate on the rural poor but permit the chance fallout
that might assist the urban poor, it has not yet on paper or in practice
been able to fully direct its efforts at the urban poor, except in terms
of the rural poor. Development Assistance Funds (DA), loan or grant
funds used to carry out AID's programs in agriculture, heal th,
nutrition, family planning, or science and technology, are not normally
permitted to be utilized for projects of urban infrastructure. Special
circumstances must exist and AID field missions must be able to
demonstrate that the development of urban physical infrastructure is
crucial to the achievement of the priority goals of that particular
country's strategy as they relate to the functional areas emphasized by
the FAA in order for a country program to explicity include such
projects. 20
Other exceptions to the DA funding rule include:
...(i) urban infrastucture which supports in a substantial
way the four pillars of the Agency (policy reform,
institutional development, technology transfer and private
enterprise development); (ii) infrastructure development in
support of private productive enterprise which creates new
permanent employment; or (iii) other cases where such
infrastructure (water, sewage, waste disposal, roads and
community facilities) are part of a comprehensive strategy
for achieving effective policies, managing urban resources
and respogfing to the needs of the lower income
population.
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Economic Support Funds (ESF) and HG funds may be used for urban
infrastructure projects. ESF funds are usually in the nature of budget
support, and are more politically than economically motivated. Those
funds are allocated to countries strategic to U.S. foreign policy
interests that have particularly severe economic or political stability
problems, though the funds are also to be used in the fulfil lment of
basic human needs, to the extent possible.
It is clear from the above that either Congress has yet to de-
emphasize its rural focus or that AID has failed to interpret
Congressional intent properly to include all people of the developing
world who are poor, not merely rural-dwellers. It is likely that the
case has not as yet been forcefully presented to Congress that most of
the world is becoming more urban since the time of the 1973 mandate, and
that the plight of the urban poor has now become sufficiently serious
that deliberate programs for them should be developed without al 1 the
various constraints on funding currently placed upon the Agency. It is
expected, for example, that by the year 2000, 70% of Egypt will be
urban. Urban area populations in many Latin American countries now
outnumber rural populations. It is, perhaps, this update that should be
made available to Congress, complete with numbers on populations in
urban areas who do not have the benefit of safe drinking water, minimal
quality housing, health care and educational facilities. These problems
and the lack of employment opportunities to provide income so that
minimum caloric intake can be maintained above the 2200 calories usually
considered to be the minimum at which a healthy adult can function and
contribute to society, are problems of which Congress must be made
aware. The case for urban development must be made if AID's overall
13
development policy is to adequately reflect and provide for solutions to
the development problems currently being faced by the developing world.
14
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CHAPTER II
THE AID DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
In the previous chapter, I examined the development of AID's urban
policy, citing some of the Congressional guidelines given to the Agency
since its inception. It is interesting now to consider the multiplicity
of external forces which are brought to bear on AID in its decision-
making process for the allocation of resources. Insofar as members of
Congress are influenced by their constituencies and many other interest
groups, the list of actors which influence AID policy decisions is
lengthy. These forces provide the framework in which AID makes
decisions. After examining the factors which enter into the policy-
making process, I shall analyze AID's own decision-making process in
terms of its political, economic and technical content.
In its preamble, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, in
states the purpose of foreign aid: "...To promote the foreign policy,
security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples
of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal
and external security, and for other purposes." Section 102 of the Act
provides the basic rationales for foreign aid-defense, economic,
political and humanitarian.1 Portions of the FAA which clearly indicate
these rationales are excerpted below:
... It is the sense of the Congress that peace depends on
wider recognition of the dignity and interdependence of
men, dnd survival of free institutions in the United States
can best be assured in a worldwide atmosphere of freedom.
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To this end, the United States has in the past
provided assistance to help strengthen the forces of
freedom by aiding peoples of less developed friendly
countries of the world to develop their resources and
improve their living standards, to realize their
aspirations for justice, education, dignity and respect as
individual human beings, and to establish responsible
governments.
The Congress declares it to be a primary necessity,
opportunity and responsibility of the United States, and
consistent with its traditions and ideals, to renew the
spirit which lay behind these past efforts, and to help
make an historic demonstration that economic growth and
political democracy can go hand in hand to the end that an
enlarged community of free, stable, and self-reliant
countries can reduce world tensions and insecurity.
It is the policy of the United States to strengthen
friendly foreign countries by encouraging the development
of their free economic institutions and productive
capabilities, and by minimizing or eliminating barriers to
the flow of private investment capital.
Also, the Congress reaffirms its convictions that the
peace of the world and the security of the United States
are endangered so long as international Communism continues
to attempt to bring under Communist domination peoples once
free but not subject to such domination. It is, therefore,
the policy of the United States to continue to make
available ... assistance of such nature and in such amounts
as the United States deems advisable and as may be
effectively used by free countries and peoples to help them
maintain their freedom. Assistance shall be based upon
sound plans and programs; be directed toward the social as
well as economic aspects of economic development; be
responsive to the efforts of the recipient countries to
mobilize their own resources and help themselves; be
cognizant of the external and internal pressures which
hamper their growth; and shall emphasize long-range
development assistance as the primary instrument of such
growth.2
The defense/security rationale for foreign aid is based not so much
on the perception that the U.S. is directly threatened by Communism, but
on the possibility that developing countries are easily threatened by
Communist incursions. The likelihood of such an event has caused the
U.S. to contribute heavily to making developing countries' military and
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police forces capable. Regional mutual security agreements to which the
U.S. is signatory commit this country to come to the defense of many
developing (and developed) countries throughout the world.
The establishment of military bases in or near developing countries
was once thought to greatly contribute to meeting U.S. and developing
country security needs, while serving as a deterrent to Communist
territorial ambitions. It is also important to note that internal
developing country conflicts as well as conflicts among developing
countries might also be discouraged as a result of such facilities,
perhaps, mitigating the possibility of a situation which would be ripe
for Communist intervention and penetration. 3  The rights to such bases
are often made more palatable to the host country when foreign aid is
given in exchange. The difficulty in terming such assistance "aid" is
that it is not clear who is the beneficiary. Military assistance for
bases is funded separately from economic assistance, the latter being
AID-financed.
Although foreign aid is not given full credit for the containment
of Communist influence, Kaplan cites it as a prominent instrument of
U.S. foreign policy toward developing countries. A passage from his
work, now almost twenty years old, provides some insight into the degree
of usefulness of foreign aid as a weapon against the spread of
Communism. The reader, alone, may make that determination:
... Threats of Communist take-over no longer seem imminent
in Greece, Iran, Guatemala, Bolivia, Lebanon, the Congo,
Leopoldville, and Guinea. At times, Iraq and Afghanistan,
Ceylon, Yemen, Algeria, and Laos seemed to be targets of
opportunity that were being successful exploited by the
Communists; in each of these countries Communist forces
appear to have been frustrated, for the present at
least...Nevertheless, it would be grossly premature to
assume that lasting containment of C mmunist power and
influence has been achieved anywhere...
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If there is one fact that most authors writing about foreign
assistance agree upon, it is that, unlike domestic spending programs,
foreign aid has no strong constituency. Although there is the feeling
among those who are proponents of foreign aid that rich countries have a
moral obligation to share their resources with poor countries, the
American public has never been convinced of that obligation nor of the
effectiveness of foreign aid in reaching the poor when aid is provided.
Statements which the FAA makes in favor of economic growth, free
economic institutions and productive capabilities, and long-range
economic and social development, have never been taken up by many inside
or outside of Congress as the moral imperatives of a wealthy society.
Huntington has described the "purist" rationale for aid, "...that
economic development should itself be a high-priority goal of U.S.
foreign policy, but that economic development assistance should not
reflect U.S. policy." 5  Long-term economic needs of foreign countries,
as stated even in the FAA, are a reality and do not lend themselves to
the kinds of directed programs with defined objectives, such as could be
found in the Marshall Plan. It is precisely this problem, the lack of
short-term political objectives, Huntington maintains, that mitigates
against political support for foreign economic assistance programs
today. If short- term political objectives should not be the rationale
for aid, according to the purists, then, since political leaders are
mainly short-termers, this rationale does not value the support of
pol i ticians. 6  Such a political argument for aid has little chance of
winning friends for the program, especially in this era of budget
trimming and U.S. deficits.
20
The establishment of long-term commercial relationships between
U.S. and developing country interests; the maintenance of supply sources
for raw materials; the opening up of new markets for U.S. products, with
the accompanying increase in U.S. jobs; are much stronger arguments for
U.S. politicians in favor of aid to sell the electorate. The need for
good world economic health, where developing countries can afford to
import U.S. supplies, farm products, machinery, and the American way of
life, is a far more saleable argument for foreign aid advocates to
present to Congress than the one of non-political, long-term economic
development needs of other countries.
The use of aid to assist "friendly" governments such as Brazil,
Iran, Chile, Egypt, and Israel at various times in our history, where
foreign economic development was surely not the primary U.S. goal, has
shown that political aid can, indeed, also have significant economic
impact. It is for the political benefits, Huntington maintains, that
the U.S. is willing to give large amounts of economic assistance.
However, he sees such assistance being decreased as fewer countries find
it in their interest to exchange resources and political cooperation for
U.S. economic assistance. Though in the last decade, there has been
much rhetoric against the political use of foreign aid, especially in
international fora; the increase in amount of ESF funds and number of
ESF recipients in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Middle East,
attest to the continuing political nature of AID giving. The significant
amounts of foreign aid being given to Costa Rica, bolstering the
strongest democracy in Central America that is now facing severe
economic problems, is but one example. The cut off of economic
assistance to Nicaragua is another. Given the objective of such aid,
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even the purists, though they may disagree with its motivation, must
accept the existence of politically-based economic assistance, which far
surpasses the amount of purely economic or humanitarian assistance to
developing countries and, indeed, has formulated much economic growth.
The Foreign Assistance Act and Congress having provided the mandate
and direction for assistance to developing countries; private and public
interest groups having exerted pressure through Congress on AID; who
else must be consulted before the Agency may begin to go about its
business of economic development? The most important actor is the
Department of State, through which most foreign policy decisions from
the White House and Congress are interpreted for AID. The coordination
with State is constant, as are Congressional and Administration foreign
policy concerns which are transmitted directly to AID. On a continuing
basis, this policy is channeled through AID's Program and Policy
Coordination Bureau (PPC) to the rest of the Agency.
It is in B. Guy Peters' discussions of the politics of bureaucracy
that the conflict between policy-making roles of formal political
actors, such as the President and Congress, and public bureaucracies
such as AID, is vividly portrayed. Since Congress has the formal and
constitutional authority, that, in and of itself, gives it legitimate
decision-making power over AID. The "power of the purse" gives Congress
the ability to control AID actions and, basical ly, to determine the
amount of autonomy the Agency has over how funds are spent. I will
return to this important issue of autonomy in my final analysis of AID's
decision-making process.
The policy-making role conflict arises often, but most frequently
it is seen when Congress seeks to not only regulate policy but also
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implement it. Peters and others admit that bureaucratic agencies are
the repositories of the information and expertise. But, in fact,
Congress has placed so many restrictions on the kinds of programs which
AID may implement and the manner in which they may be implemented, that
the Agency finds itself providing technically and economically sound
judgments as to appropriate economic development policy, only to have
those judgments subordinated to Congressional concerns that often have
little to do with economic development.
A plethora of other restrictions are placed upon AID by the
Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and the Treasury, as well as the
Office of Management and Budget. AID funding levels and policy choices
are evaluated variously in terms of opportunity costs, political
leverage, and future export markets, by all of these and the other
previously-mentioned actors. Technical and development expertise is
solicited from AID at different stages in the policy-making process.
Testimony on Capitol Hill by AID personnel is frequent and, indeed, is
an annual event for the media to take the opportunity to criticize the
Agency. Who plays what role and where are which decisions made is still
unclear, as agencies seek to play important roles in how much and in
what manner foreign aid is provided.
The question of policy-making responsibility may be the result of a
lack of agreement clear understanding as to the purpose of foreign aid,
though the core mission of the Agency is clearly economic development.
If the core mission is clear to all the dctors, then it might be
valuable to determine how and where the responsibility for policy
formulation and decision-making lies. As it now stands, aid is used,
effectively or ineffectively, some would maintain, as an instrument of
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foreign policy; as a tool to promote foreign economic development and
growth; as a reflection of U.S. attempts at remedying American social
problems through set-aside funding of contracts for small businesses,
disadvantaged, or minority-owned firms; or as a mechanism for
strengthening markets abroad. There is no reason why foreign aid should
not serve any or all of these purposes; however, the administrative
burden placed upon the Agency from outside to achieve these purposes is
needlessly severe and uncoordinated.
There are so many Congressionally-mandated concerns with which to
deal, that the process of project design, development, approval and
contracting exceeds two years. The assumptions upon which a project is
developed often change by the time the project begins implementation.
Project management on the American side as well as in the host country
may change as well. Is this process the most efficient and effective
mechanism to arrive at the first stage of project implementation? It
would seem more rational for external concerns to be made known to AID
directly so that the Agency, itself, might formulate the best policy
that would allow the process of economic development to take place in
the most informed, expeditious manner possible.
As it now stands, once AID receives the inputs from these actors,
the Agency has the political framework from which it proceeds to make
its own economic and technical decisions. Informal discussions are held
between recipient government personnel and the USAID missions in the
field. Sector and other technical analyses follow to determine what
the situation is in a particular area, often with privately-contracted
assistance to complement AID's technical staff. The task then is to
identify the pieces of the whole which are feasible for U.S. economic
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assistance.
Constraints again arise, this time concerning the Agency's own
internal requirements regarding the appropriate areas for the Agency to
emphasize, given the political framework imposed externally. These
requirements reflect the thinking of the Administrator of the Agency, a
presidential appointee, who works with the Agency's policy staff to
formulate the ideology under which the Agency operates. It is not
surprising, therefore, that under the Reagan Administration the four
"pillars" of AID include: private enterprise development; policy reform;
human resource and institutional development; and technology transfer.
The hallmark of the Carter Administration emphasized the granting of aid
to friendly countries with acceptable human rights records. The
pol itical input is an expected part of foreign assistance and varies
with every Administration.
The new requirements are considered by the USAID missions in light
of discussions with host country officials concerning the areas which
might lend themselves to AID assistance. If a mission feels that there
is a match in interests between the two governments and a possibility
for successful intervention, then the AID mission will go forward and
specify these areas in the Country Development Strategy Statement
(CDSS), which is presented to AID/Washington (AID/W) each year. The
CDSS will lay out AID's overall strategy for development in a country,
with annexes for individual sectors, stating goals and objectives for
the program in, for example, urban development, agriculture, or
industrialization. The analysis which goes into the CDSS moves missions
to define country problems in terms of opportunities for AID, as
measured by host country interest and commitment; visibility as to
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development impact and recognition of AID assistance; as well as
leverage, especially for policy reform. From the CDSS document, AID
proceeds in the development and programming of funds for individual
projects, as shown in Figure 1.
In order to press forward in projecting the strategy for a country,
many sector assessments, pre-feasibility studies feasibility studies and
project design team efforts, are financed by AID. As previously
mentioned, sometimes these studies precede the strategy, since it is
often the case that the Agency must obtain sufficient information about
a sector to make decisions on what strategy should be followed. In
addition, technical studies are undertaken to confirm or reject widely
held notions about a particular development area and how the Agency
should formulate its program. The National Urban Policy Study for
Egypt provides an excel lent example of a study which was used with other
studies, for the development of the Fiscal Year 1986 Egypt CDSS Annex-
Urban Policy and Strategy Update. Since the urban area has been
designated as one of the top region-wide priorities for AID's Near East
Bureau for the 1983-1988 period, due to the increasingly difficult
problems facing the cities in the region, and AID's largest program in
the Near East being Egypt, the logical country for such a sector study
was Egypt.
The NUPS study was completed in 1982 and a new USAID/Cairo mission
urban strategy has since been accepted by Washington. The process for
developing that strategy is of interest since the technical study is or
was to have been the major input to that strategy. By juxtaposing the
NUPS study with the Egypt CDSS Annex on Urban Policy, the significant
26
difference between those two efforts will provide the basis for my
comparison between the theoretical framework for decision-making and how
decisions actually are made.
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Figure 1
COSS - Country Development Strategy Statement
SAT - Bureau for Science and Technology
FVA - Bureau for Food & Voluntary Assistance
ABS - Annual Budget Submission
PID - Project Identification Document
OMB - Office of Management & Budget
OYB - Operating Year Budget
PP - Project Paper
ProAg - Project greement
PlO/T - Project Implementation Order, lechnical
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P - "" Participant
LDC - Less Developed Country
HIS - Management Information System
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CHAPTER III
THE NATIONAL URBAN POLICY STUDY FOR EGYPT (NUPS) AND AID'S COUNTRY
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT (CDSS)--A COMPARISON
The National Urban Policy Study for Egypt (NUPS) was undertaken in
July, 1980. The effort grew out of the urging by both the World Bank
and AID for the Government of Egypt's (GOE) Ministry of Development to
prepare and adopt an urban policy after both lending agencies had been
approached for urban sector funds. Previously, United Nations
consultants to the Ministry had helped the GOE to develop a National
Physical Plan, a plan that was a "needs-based" plan that assessed the
need for schools, housing, infrastructure, etc., and how the response to
those needs by the government would be distributed over the total
settlement system.
AID financed a contract with PADCO, a Washington-based consulting
firm, to perform an urban policy study which would provide the Agency
with the kinds of information and recommendations it needed to determine
how to proceed in the urban sector in Egypt. The contractor made the
determination early on, if it was to fulfill its objective of examining
an overall urban policy for Egypt, that the study would not concentrate
on the GOE's limited objective of promoting new cities in remote areas
but, rather, it would examine macroeconomic development issues in
relation to the settlement system as a whole. The NUPS study utilized
many existing studies and plans available from the GOE and other
international donors and sought to use Egyptian national development
objectives as a starting point. Those objectives were:
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Sustaining a high rate of economic growth.
Improving the standard of living of all Egyptians, with
emphasis on low-income groups through:
Creating productive employment opportunities for the
rapidly growing population.
Generating sustained increases in real per capita
income.
Ensuring that public service and facility gains are
equitably shared by the Egyptian people.
Achieving certain special objectives:
Encouragement of the deconcentration of Cairo.
Protection of arable land from urbanization.
Demonstration of an expression of modernization and
progress.1
On the AID side, the Agency was sincere in its search for good
urban projects and an understanding of the existing urban situation.
Studies on land use policy, urban financing, infrastructure, the
informal housing sector, and housing and community upgrading, had either
just been completed or were about to get underway during this period.
The desire to lend some rationality to the manner in which AID and the
GOE approached these urban issues was the motivation for NUPS, and there
was no question that financing for urban projects could be made
available for good projects, especially following the 1979 Camp David
Agreement.
The NUPS study was completed in 1982; AID's Egypt Country
Development Strategy Statement Urban Annex was developed for FY 1984
early in 1982, then updated for FY 1986 in April of 1984. Since the
NUPS was completed and its recommendations were included almost in their
entirety in the 1984 CDSS Urban Annex, the following analysis will focus
31
on the measure to which NUPS served as an input to the urban program
then and later in the FY 1986 Egypt CDSS Urban Policy and Strategy
Update. The NUPS and CDSS statements regarding NUPS recommendations
will be examined in turn. My analysis of the reasons for which AID's
current urban strategy for Egypt does not more closely resemble this
major technical input will be the basis for the following chapter.
It is useful to note at this juncture that PADCO's product, the
NUPS study for Egypt, and the Urban Development Assessment (UDA)
methodology which resulted from it, are generally regarded by AID as
comprehensive, excel lent pieces of work. AID's office of Housing and
Urban Programs has published PADCO's "Guidelines for Preparing Urban
Development Assessments," the methodology developed by PADCO in Egypt,
as guidance to AID field missions for undertaking UDA's. The Agency has
contracted PADCO to test the methodology in Somalia, Nepal and Senegal
in national, regional, and city-oriented approaches, and has funded a
project of over $11.0 million in AID/W to provide missions with UDA-type
assistance. Therefore, I have concluded from these examples of
replication of the UDA methodology and my various interviews with AID
and PADCO officials, that the NUPS study is, indeed, technically sound.
Annex 2 provides a description of the UDA guidelines.
The FY 1986 CDSS Urban Annex states:
...A sound urban development approach for Egypt should be
based upon our major recommendations laid out by the
National Urban Policy Study... The Study recommends
substantial modifications in current policies and programs.
It proposes careful GOE consideration be given to the
following:
1. That attention be given to exploiting the strong
economic advantage of the Cairo and Alexandria
metropolitan regions to absorb major portions of
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deconcentrating the cores of these cities by
establishing other close-in satellite setttlements
similar to the 6th of October and El Obour presently
underway in the Cairo Region;
2. That planned future investments in free standing new
towns such as the 10th of Ramadan, Sadat City and New
Ameriya be significantly curtailed and that focus be
directed on additional growth in the Canal Cities, and
in a limited number of Upper Egyptian Cities;
3. That the standards selected for housing and related
services reflect greater affordability within urban
areas. The development of housing and infrastructure
standards are needed that are affordable by a broader
portion of the urban population. Increased efforts
also are needed to recover public investment outlays
from the recipients of publicly-supported housing and
services;
4. That the amount of public investment in industrial
investment policies and sectorial policies for housing
and infrastructure be conserved. Priority should be
given to encouragement of private investment in job
creation, housing, and related infrastructure
development; and
5. That a strategy for preserving agricultural land and
managing growth in the Delta Cities be carefully
followed.2
Although AID concurs with the policy as outlined by NUPS, it also
has decided to concentrate its urban efforts in a very few areas in
which the Egyptians are already working. The strategy it has chosen
centers on concurrence with NUPS that... "the dominance of Cairo and
Alexandria in the urban system will continue; that huge deficits exist
in necessary urban infrastructure, especially in the country's principal
cities; and that inefficiencies in resource allocation are due to
institutional weaknesses and market signal distortions."3
NUPS has laid out the elements of a national urban policy for Egypt
which would lead to a development strategy (See Diagram 1). AID has
taken that framework and added to it the strategy and programs/projects
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Diagram 1
ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL URBAN POLICY FOR EGYPT
FOR EGYPT
DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINTS
V
POPULATION:
a High Rate of Growth
* Decreasing External Demand f6r Labor
SETTLEMENT DISTRIBUTION:
0 Rapid Urban Growth
* Increased Migration
- Rural to Urban
-. Small to Larger City
INFRASTRUCTURE / SERVICES:
* Large Current Defi-cits
* Large Future Needs
POLICY ADMINISTRATION
O Dverlapping and Dispersed Authority Nationally
e 'ncertain Relationsnip National to Local
ECONOMY:
* Difficulty in Sustaining High Growth Rate
* Insufficient Domestic Saving
INDU~STRY:
@ Weakness in Domestic Economy
* Low Productivity Public Sector
e Non-Selective Use of Incentives
- Sectoral
- Location
POTENTIAL RESOURCE
SHORTFALLS:
@ Domestic Investment Finance
* Agricultural Lands
e Water
EMPLOYMENT:
a Over-expansion of Service Employment
relative to Industrial Employment
* Slow Growth in Farm Employment
DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES
* Efficiency Orientation in Settlement System V Conservation of Public Investment Funds
MAJOR METROPOLITAN GROWTH
* Cairo Region (Including, New Satellites
and New Towns)
* Alexandria Region (Including, New Satellites
and New Towns)
* Suez
DELTA GROWTH MANAGEMENT
Miaration inducement to non-arable land
* sites in Major Metropolitan Regions
# 'Sectoral/Location Control Industry
# Focus Expansion Service Centers
DECENTRALIZATION:
# No More than Three Uriper Eqypt Sites
* Finance only Hirh Pay-off Projects in
other Areas
METROPOLITAN GROWTH
MANAGEMENT:
* Core Deconrentration
a Increased De-nsity-Peripneral visms
* Fringe Sites and Close-in Sattelites
INDUSTRY and REGIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE:
e Fmphasize Industrial Sector in Investment
* Intenrate Sectoral and Location Policies with
Spatial Strateqy
* Infrastructure Support for Spatial Strategy
URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE and
SERVICES :
* Affordable Service Standards
@ Improved Cost Reccvery
* Standards/Recovery Related to Spatial Targets
V
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Source: PADCO National Urban Policy Study, Urban Management Handbook,
Washington, DC, July 1982.
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Diagram 2
Diagra 1
'EL
URIAN POLICY FRAMEWORK
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Settlement Distribution Industry
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Policy Administration Employment
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Efficiency in Settlement Systems ,bnservation of Public
Investment Funds
Major Metropolitan Growth Metropolitan Growth Management
Delta Growth Management Industry & Regional Infrastructure
Decentralization Urban Infrastructure and Services
Development Strategy
Co
Do
ncentration Cairo/Alex Delta, Canal Cities, upper Egypt
Acceptance GOE, U.S. Congress, AID,
Business Community
Impact D>evelopmontal
Basic Human Needs
Spread Effect
-Ability Ease of implementation
Short-term (3-5 year)
- . Minimum policy/instit. constraints
Appropriate Technology
Developmnt Prorams/Projects
Environmental Upgrading
Cairo/Alexandria
Delta
Canal Cities
Upper Egyptian Cities
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Infrastructure-water/wastewater
Transportation
Neighborhood Services/
Solid Waste Activities
Growth Management
Industrial Development and
water/wastewater infrastructure
Decentralization, Industrial
Development in selected cities,
infrastructure support
Source: FY 1986 CDSS Urban Policy and Strategy Update, Agency for
International Development, Washington, D.C., 1984.
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it has chosen to implement (See Diagram 2). Particularly interesting is
the addition by AID under Development Strategy of "Acceptance,"
"Impact," and "Do-Ability." These are given as three fundamental
project selection to be used as an "initial screening device" by AID,
and are defined as:
1. Acceptance: High acceptance to Egyptian bureaucracy
and to the masses of low/moderate income Egyptians;
U.S. Congress and AID bureaucracy satisfied that
program adequately addresses goals and objectives of
foreign assistance and has high visibility; and U.S.
business interests sufficiently addressed.
2. Impact: Strong development impact related directly to
economic vitality of urban areas and/or productivity of
workers; strong basic human needs impact, meeting one
or more basic human needs; significant spread affect
impact by linking one or more of USAID's urban
activities together; and balance of payments impact,
meeting Egypt's balance of payments needs.
3. Do-Ability: Easily do-able within 3 to 5 year
timeframe. Activities should not be overly encumbered
by policy or institutional constraints that would
seriously hinder implementation. (On the other hand,
the activities should contribute to achieving policy
reform.) Nor should activities be too complex in terms
of the mix of goods and services or technology. In
addition, the activity should be within an appropriate
and feasible USAID funding level.
Since the NUPS team was not provided with these three criteria, the
NUPS report reflects only the technical judgments and recommendations of
the U.S. contractor and Egyptian sub-contractor firms as to the existing
urban situation at the time of the report, and suggested modifications
to the GOE's present and future urban strategy development.
The NUPS study presents a recommended strategy and compares it to
six alternative spatial and sectoral strategies for urban populations,
utilizing differing standards and criteria for selection. Job creation
was a priority for the NUPS, and by following a strategy of locating
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investment primarily in urban areas, the selected alternative resulted
in the highest probability of generating employment most efficiently
with the highest level of benefits and benefits net of cost. The
"Preferred Strategy" also located industrial and service investments
where they already existed. Although this strategy was calculated to
have larger benefits and net benefits in Alternative A, (See Table 1),
the Preferred Strategy was selected because the level of required
decentralization and expected loss was more acceptable to NUPS. 5  The
CDSS Urban Strategy will be compared to the NUPS Preferred Strategy for
development. Details on the Preferred Strategy are provided in Annex
3.
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Table 1
SU*ARY OF NUPS BENEFIT/COST ANALYSIS
Inter-Urban Annual
Average Net Benefits
Per Capita
(19851-2000)
As Percent
Annual Average Net
Benefits w/Inter-Urban
Infrastructure Included
(1985-2000)
An Percent
Settlement Alternative Total of Preferred Total of Preferred
(L.E.) (M (L.E.) (5)
Preferred Strategy 635 100 521 100
Alternative A (concentration
in places with economic
growth potential) 643 101 540 104
Alternative C (decentraliza-
tion to multiple growth .
nodes and remote areas) 423 67 241 56
Source: Agency for International Development, Urban Development Support
Services Project Paper, Office of Housing and Urban Programs, Washington,
September, 1983.
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NUPS Recommendations:
1. The exploitation of strong economic advantages of the
Cairo and Alexandria Metropolitan Regions to absorb a
major portion of the expected growth in urban
population while reducing concentration in core areas
(plans for Cairo year 2000 population of 16 to 16.5
mil lion, including 10th of Ramadan, Sadat City, New
Ameriyah and closer-in satellites).
2. A concentrated effort to support growth possibilities
of the Suez Canal Zone with a focus on Suez City (year
2000 population targets of 750,000 to 850,000 in Suez,
400,000 to 500,000 in Ismailia and 550,000 to 650,000
in Port Said).
3. A strategy for managing the expected spontaneous growth
in Delta Cities which aims to hold growth substantially
below trend rates to limit unnecessary intrusions on
arable land while providing additional urban employment
(special emphasis on Tanta and Mansoura with year 2000
population targets of 525,000 to 575,000 and 500,000
to 550,000, respectively).
4. An effort to induce additional growth in an initially
limited number of Upper Egypt cities to develop both an
economic basis and a knowledge base for more
decentralization in later time periods than the
planning horizon of this study (special emphasis on
Assiut, Qena/Naga Hamadi and Aswan with year 2000
population targets of 550,000 to 600,000; 325,000 to
400,000; and 400,000 to 450,000, respectively).
5. An approach to the settlement problems of the remote
areas to find innovative ways to utilize emerging
technologies and establish implementing institutions to
increase the attraction of these areas for human
settlements (major urban population increases are not
anticipated, the year 2000 population targets for the
existing main settlements are 400,000 a slight increase
over trend growth).
6. A program to maintain infrastructure and services in
other urban places.
7. The choice of standards for housing and infrastructure
service levels that are affordable by a wider range of
the population and mechanisms that will increase the
proportion of public cost recovery.
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8. Increased emphasis on the industrial sector in economic
planning, encouragement of private investment to
conserve public funds support for small-scale industry,
and integration of spatial and sectoral planning
through selective use of direct investment, tax and
non-tax location instruments. 6
Recommendation 1: AID's strategy in Cairo and Alexandria is to
concentrate on infrastructure support. The combined expenditure
proposed for sewerage and wastewater projects from FY 1984 - FY 1987
total approximately $1.0 billion. It is of note that the request for
such assistance from the Egyptian government was made at the
Presidential level. 7
In order to accomplish the deconcentration of Cairo, even while it
reaches the projected population of over 16 mil lion by the year 2000,
NUPS recommended:
Preparation of sites in desert fringe areas as alternative
locations for low-income people in crowded Cairo kisms
(precincts)to shift the axis of development froma north-
south direction to an east-west direction.
Acceleration of development at higher densities in current
low-density portions of the region.
The development of a larger number of small non-contiguous
settlements on the periphery but closer to the current
built-up areas than 10th of Ramadan and Sadat City, such as
El Obour and 6th of October.
Consideration of modifying development plans for 10th of
Ramadan and Sadat City to permit resources to be allocated
for the alternative developments above and, through their
development, to make location in 10th of Ramadan and,
subsequently, Sadat City more attractive for business and
residence in the future. The kinds of modification include
reduced tandards, higher densities, and greater cost
recovery.
The new community in Helwan, developed with AID financing beginning
in 1978, is the only ongoing activity which can be categorized as
responding to this recommendation. However, the project is the only
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low-cost housing/upgrading project and cannot rightfully be termed a
response to NUPS recommendations since it began before NUPS was
undertaken. No other assistance has been provided related to this
recommendation, other than the possibility of a Ring Road, discussed
under Recommendations 6 and 7.
Recommendation 2: NUPS recommended an increased effort to develop
the Suez Canal region cities of Suez City, Ismailia and Port Said as a
major urban center.
AID's strategy makes reference to the continuing support for
rehabilitation and improvement measures to municipal water and sewerage
facilities in the Suez region, projects which were authorized in 1978.
No other efforts are mentioned, though AID financed the Suez and
Quattamia Cement Projects, in 1976 and 1978 respectively, bringing
increased investments to the area. A Community Health Personnel
Training Project, whose purpose is to increase health services through
medical education was also funded in 1980. These limited efforts, begun
before NUPS, do not provide the catalyst for major urban development in
this region, which the NUPS study recommended.
Recommendation 3: NUPS proposed growth management strategy for the
Delta consists of:
Encouragement of migration from the Del ta (where most
growth is necessarily on arable land) to the major
metropolitan regions of Cairo and Alexandria and the
growing region of the Suez Canal (where growth is possible
on desert land rather than on high productivity
agricultural land, if properly managed.)
Consolidation of regional service center functions (such as
major medical facilities, warehousing, service facilities
for agricultural equipment) in two to three Delta cities,
rather than their duplication in all governorate capitals
and other relatively large cities.
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Formal recognition of the entire Delta as a region for
regional planning purposes and the development of an
integrated economic and physical development plan for the
region.
Immediate development of information and analysis (of the
kind provided in NUPS Illustrative Development Projects for
Tanta and Qena/Naga Hamadi) to support near-term physical
development and land use planning.
Establishment of a formal, publicly recognized,
for defining and adjusting city boundaries.
procedure
A moratorium on all industrial, institutional and housing
projects outside existing city boundaries; until any such
projects have been determined to be consistent with both
national urban policy and the proposed integrated economic
and physical regional plan.
Initiation of a requirement that proposals for sectoral
projects, which are the responsibility of national
ministries (e.g., Transportation, Industry, and Health) be
reviewed for consistency with the regional plan before
implementation.
Initiation of a requirement that all proposed industrial
projects for the Delta be examined to determine the
possibility of their being located outside the Delta
without serious loss of profitability relative to a Delta
location.9
AID's CDSS Annex on Decentralization and the Decentralization
Sector Assessment pointed to "...the need to up-grade services in
medium-sized towns where living conditions are often as poor as those in
major urban areas or in rural villages..." a need to "...provide a
framework for institution building and planning and management in the
markazes, (districts), governorates and regional offices to complement
work already done in the villages."1 0 The action proposed by AID is a
Delta Secondary Cities (DSC) Project which would:
1. assist the GOE in carrying out Law No. 3, 1983, Town
Planning Act, that requires local units of government
to draw up master plans and revise them every five
years for land use, infrastructure, public services,
urban renewal and area upgrading;
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2. develop a practical public and private action framework
for guiding future urbanization in appropriate areas
away from fertile agricultural lands to non-fertile
desert lands and to higher and more efficient land use
standards consistent with the National Urban Policy,
NUPS recommendations; and
3. provide investment for area upgrading and
infrastructure development in selected DSC's.
Although the DSC Project is envisioned as a $100 million project
over the course of four or five years, the project seeks to go further
than the NUPS land use planning recommendation and:
... will assist in the integration of the Delta cities to
the major metropolitan centers of Cairo, Alexandria and the
Canal Cities... deconcentrate the predominance of economic
activities from Cairo and Alexandria, as appropriate, to
other areas within the context of good mana ement and
conservation principles for agricultural lands. 1
If approved, this project, together with the existing Neighborhood
Urban Services Project, will serve to strengthen local governments'
ability to manage, to make decisions, to provide services, to administer
local revenue and to generate it.
Recommendation 4: The NUPS recommendation to induce growth in three
Upper Egypt cities over time is based on phased investment in basic
services and high payoff industries only.
The economic development constraints of a limited industrial base,
large distances from domestic and international markets, and poor
telecommunications and transport systems are but a few of the reasons
AID has not chosen to focus on this NUPS recommendation in its
strategy. It is important to note here that by taking this option, AID
has chosen to avoid major activities in an area of the country which has
long held symbolic importance to Egyptians and, in terms of political
impact, might have netted significant returns.
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Recommendation 5: Development of Egypt's remote areas for human
settlement, far removed from Cairo, has been shown to be extremely
costly, with little chance of attracting significant populations in the
near term. Although the NUPS study recommended some small efforts be
taken to utilize innovative technologies to enhance the attraction of
remote areas in the long-run, AID has made the determination that it
will concentrate its financial resources in other areas with more
potential for short-run success. A major NUPS recommendation to the GOE
is the reassessment of the New Towns Policy of establishing four new
cities in the desert which would hold a total population of over 1.5
million by the year 2000. NUPS considers this GOE goal to be extremely
optimistic.
AID's Renewable Energy Field Testing Project approved in 1982, is
examining various solar technologies which would be economic for remote
area applications; however, there is no AID action planned for the
immediate future which would seek to directly encourage large-scale
development of the New Towns.
Recommendations 6 and 7: NUPS recommendations on infrastructure
and services begin by pointing out that the existing water and sewerage
network is currently insufficient. AID current and planned water and
wastewater projects form the largest portion of new assistance to Egypt,
and the USAID mission has judged that its wastewater projects neither
encourage nor discourage physical expansion of Cairo and Alexandria.
The CDSS states that it is possible that the project in Alexandria will
lead to the expansion of the city, but in Cairo, the provision of water
and wastewater services has followed urban development. 13 The policy
recommendations for the GOE that have been put forth by NUPS and
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supported by AID, seek to strengthen this sector and, in fact, will be
crucial for the successful operation and maintenance of these systems in
the future. They are as follows:
1. Local water and wastewater organizations need to
develop the capacity to forecast their revenue
requirements; establish and collect adequate tariffs;
and should be provided with budget support by the GOE
adequate to cover shortfalls;
2. Local water and wastewater organizations need to
develop as financially independent organizations
responsible for the full range of activities required
to provide water and wastewater services;
3. The National Organization for Potable Water and
Sanitary Drainage (NOPWASD) needs to develop the
capacity to establish policies for the water and
wastewater utilities with technical assistance and
training support on a contractual basis; and
4. Local water and wastewater organizations need to be
able to hire qualified staff and retain them through
training and adequate incentives.14
In addition to the $1.0 billion previously mentioned for this sector,
water and other infrastructure support are being supplied through AID's
existing Neighborhood Urban Services and Provincial Cities Projects,
both components of the Decentralization Sector Program.
NUPS housing recommendations for GOE policy-makers are designed
"...to improve basic housing conditions of urban Egyptians throughout
the settlement system who are unequally treated as a result of the
current distribution of urban services or other GOE spatial objectives.
The second objective is the design of ... specific investment packages to
achieve modifications in the settlement system. The latter objective
assumes the GOE seeks to facilitate private sector takeovers of housing
production. "15
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AID, through its Low-Cost Housing and Community Upgrading Project
near Cairo, is demonstrating that suitable basic shelter and community
facilities can be developed at low cost with community participation.
Technical training through the establishment of a training center, as
well as credit to homeowners to upgrade existing housing, is being made
available under this project. Housing affordability, a particular
concern of NUPS, resulted in their making several recommendations
regarding possible lending to private informal sector providers of
housing, possibly through the General Authority for Housing and Building
Cooperatives (GAHBC). These recommendations seek to provide financial
assistance to larger numbers of households than are currently served by
mortgage financing. There are no new mechanisms AID has developed to
deal with this financing problem other then those provided in the
above-mentioned housing project, which was authorized in 1978.16
Improved cost recovery, not only for housing, but also for services
such as water supply, sanitation and electricity, is crucial if the GOE
is to begin to finance salaries and operating expenses of public
services. A policy dialogue is ongoing between the GOE and AID, as well
as with other donors such as the World Bank, regarding an increase in
user charges, as current fee scales do not provide sufficient revenue
for maintenance of systems nor for sorely-needed system expansions.
NUPS Inter-urban transport recommendations rely on the existing
network, for the most part, but emphasize the need to shift the axis of
Greater Cairo growth from a north-south direction to an east-west
direction in order to direct development to non-arable land. The
concept of a Ring Road which would reduce private car traffic inside
the existing agglomeration; support the process of urban
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deconcentration; and protect agricultural areas from urban encroachment
has been proposed for funding by AID. 17 This concept was first proposed
in 1970 in the Cairo Preliminary Master Plan and is currently the
subject of a pre-feasibility study by AID. The NUPS team has
specifically advised against such a concept, as it believes it will not
serve, to any great extent, to deconcentrate traffic in Cairo. The Ring
Road's eastern portion, which would connect Upper Egypt through the
ports, thereby by-passing the Delta and preserving Delta land, is the
NUPS recommendation. If approved, the Ring Road Project may cost up to
$200 million over a four-year period.
In the electric power sector, NUPS recommendations deal mainly with
the necessity for an energy conservation policy, coupled with an effort
to increase user fees. The study concluded:
1. The very large reliance which Egypt's energy planners
have placed on electrical energy would result in
electrical energy consumption exceeding 20 percent of
total commercial energy consumption, which is a ration
about twice the current ratio of industrialized
countries such as France and the U.S. Given the high
costs of construction of electrical energy facilities,
a more direct use of energy might result in
considerable savings in energy infrastructure invest-
ment.
2. The choice of technology for generating Egypt's future
electrical energy requirements has an important role in
the costs of providing electrical energy and in energy
resource requirements. Nuclear energy facilities
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involve high capital costs during construction, require
longer construction periods than conventional
technologies, and unless economically recoverable
uranium reserves are found, a heavy reliance on
foreign inputs. However, once constructed, nuclear
facilites can result in higher efficiencies in
electrical energy generation and reduced marginal
costs.
3. Although Egypt's electrical demand will increase due to
increased population pressures and increased commercial
and industrial demands, significant energy savings are
possible through modernization of existing industrial
plants to be more efficient in energy consumption and
through careful choice of industrial technology for
future industries which efficiently utilize energy.
4. Egypt's present energy policy results in a significant
loss of revenue to the electrical energy sector due to
petroleum subsidies. The current pricing structure has
the effect of subsidizing the largest consumers through
higher tariffs to small consumers. Given the high
import component for new construction of the sector, a
move towards economic pricing of electrical energy
could result in reduced demands on public resources and
greater conservation of use of electrical energy.
5. The present configuration of the national power grid is
largely adequate to meet the future settlement pattern
recommended by NUPS. However, within that grid,
investments will have to be made to increase
transmission capacity. Due to expected relatively
small populations projected for the remote areas, it is
not recommended that major investments in extension of
the national grid be undertaken to serve them. Rather,
alternative technologies aimed at utilizing local
renewable energy resources, notably solar and wind
power, should be developed to provide them with
electrical energy.
6. Consideration should be given to using the relatively
lower costs of generating electrical power in North and
South Upper Egypt as incentives to industrial location
in those zones. At economic prices, the costs of
hydroelectric power generation are in the range of 4.02
milliemes/kWh vs. 45.6 milliemes/kWh for oil-fired
power plants. However, in siting future industries in
Upper Egypt, consideration should be given to total
future electrical energy demands as full hydroelectric
capacity should be reached during the 1985-1990 period.
Thus, development of very large industrial consumers of
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electrical energy may resul t in electricity demands
which exceed hydroelectric capacity and, thus,
necessitate construction of thermal plants which may
not be justifiable in those locations.
7. Much greater attention should be paid towards energy
conservation in the development of both new industrial
plant and expansion of commercial and residential
electrical uses. Conservation by these consumers can
lead to reduced demand and, thus, a lessened
requiremer for new construction of generating
facilities.
AID has had many opportunities to impress upon the GOE the need for
policy reforms in the power sector. The over $.5 billion in assistance
in this sector to date makes AID a significant voice in this sector, and
its recent moratorium on new generation projects until some movement in
price increases could be seen, is having a positive impact on Egypt's
present and scheduled increases in future energy prices. In addition,
new projects in Energy Policy Planning and Renewable Energy both deal
with providing energy conserving techniques to Egypt. The Energy Policy
Planning Project seeks to strengthen the GOE's institutional
capabilities to undertake energy analyses, and will provide training in
energy economics and modelling techniques, as well as energy auditing
equipment and audits. Industrial energy conservation is a particularly
important component of that project for the potential to increase
foreign exchange by conserving exportable petroleum is significant.
Similarly, the Renewable Energy Field Testing Project has great
potential for contributing to energy supplies, especially if Egypt's
energy policies begin pricing to approach world market prices, making
renewables a more economically attractive option.
As far as telecommunications assistance is concerned, previous
estimates utilizing smaller population growth figures for Egypt, caused
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the NUPS team to re-evaluate future telephone demand. Revenue
requirements for the system range from LE 12.4 billion (Egyptian pounds)
to L.E. 22.4 bil lion (Egyptian pounds), the lower estimate reflecting
reduced demand, improved technology, and more careful pricing. 19 AID
has provided almost $250 million for telecommunications equipment
expansion and modernization since 1978, and has no plans for futher
assistance in this sector at the moment.
The NUPS examined bulk water requirements for Greater Cairo, the
Canal, and Remote Area Zones only, due to the fact that other zones have
access to groundwater or surface water. (Bulk water is defined as water
"imported" from other regions via pipelines or canals). 2 0  Since
resources required for Cairo and the Canal area will both be satisfied
shortly, they were not included in the NUPS investment plan.
Requirements for the remote areas are included; however,since, in the
short-run, rapid development of these areas is not recommended by NUPS,
and AID does not contemplate any action there, no assistance will be
forthcoming for remote areas. AID water assistance to Cairo, Alexandria
and the Canal cities is delineated under Recommendation 1.
Recommendation 8: This NUPS recommendation seeks to emphasize the
need for industrial and settlement policy to be mutually reinforcing.
The importance of job creation for economic growth is the key here, and
the NUPS study stresses the need to attract new industrial investments
to cities which provide a tax base. NUPS also recommends Egyptian public
policy be based on the following:
1. Investment should be channeled toward increasing the
relative share of manufacturing in Gross Domestic
Product and employment.
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2. Inducements, incentives and taxes should be structured
to support spatial and sectoral objectives of national
urban policy. This entails making discriminating use
of tax abatements, subsidies, and taxes.
Discrimination should be exercised with respect to both
the number of places where positive inducements are
offered and the sectoral activities which are eligible.
3. Non-tax incentives should be used, also, in support of
spatial objectives. Three such incentives are sites,
labor and credit. 21
The provision of serviced sites, trained labor and access to
credit, are all important if private investment is to be encouraged.
Utilization of taxes to discourage location in areas such as Cairo or
Alexandria in favor of locations in other areas such as satellite
cities, is recommended to promote effective industrial location
policy.22
A number of constraints to industrial development have been
identified by NUPS as well as by a Boston University "Industrial Sector
Strategy Assessment" for AID in 1981-1982:
price/cost distortions; institutional constraints; admini-
strative restrictions on private sector operations;
managerial inefficiencies of public sector industry; and
the narrowness of the Egyptian market, comb2?ed with the
difficulties of breaking into export markets.
AID assistance to this sector focusses on economically-efficient
expansion in either public or private industry. In its dialogue with
the GOE on moving Egypt toward a market economy, AID has stressed price
reform, expanding the private sector, and reinforcement of management
autonomy in the public sector. 24  In terms of projects, management and
technological development, industrial productivity improvement,
commodities, and credit resources comprise the majority of AID's already
existing efforts. Future opportunities for assistance to enhance
private sector industries, export-oriented industries, and small and
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medium scale private sector industries, are being pursued; 2 5 however,
locational considerations of assistance in these areas are crucial and
are not planned for action as presently described in the CDSS.
These, then, are the major areas which the NUPS team highlighted in
their work. There are significant numbers of policy recommendations by
NUPS to the GOE on how to carry out these recommendations which have not
been enumerated here. For a detailed description, I would refer the
reader to the NUPS study itself.
The final major area which AID highlights in the CDSS but is not
singled out in any significant manner by NUPS, is that of solid waste
disposal for Cairo. Major support is being contemplated by USAID/Cairo
for construction of compacting plants and land-fill solid waste disposal
activities of over $150 million over the next four years. Clean-up
campaigns, plastic bag manufacturing, and motorcycle refuse collection
efforts are currently being undertaken within the existing Neighborhood
Urban Services Project in Alexandria and Cairo. 2 6
Table 2 provides a Summary of the urban projects proposed for FY
1985-FY 1988. The following analysis will focus upon the issues which
were implicit in the NUPS recommendations and the possible reasons for
which AID has proposed that its new efforts concentrate only in those
areas outlined in Table 2.
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Table 2
-38-
PORTFOLIO OF SUGGESTED URBAN ACTIVITIES/PROJECTS 1985-83
PROJECT ASSISTANCE
Water/Wastewater
FY 84* FY 85 'FY 86 FY 87 FY 88
200 200 200 200 200
'IOTAL
(by project)
1 Billion
Ring-Road 50 50 50 50 200 million
Solid Waste 15 15 15 15 60 million
Roads improvements 10 10 20 million
other support activities
Cormodity Import 25 25 25 25 100 million
(Equipment solid waste)
Decentralization
NUS 20 20 20 60 million
DSC 25 25 25 25 100 million
TOTAL 125 145 135 135
Grand Total
including water/
wastewater 200 345 345 345
*FY184 also proposes $20 million in Urban Electricity and
in the population program.
Source: Agency for International Development, "Egypt FY 1986 Country Development
Strategy Statement", Annex G, Urban Policy and Strategy Update, Washington, DC,
April 1984.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Al though the NUPS study has never been officially accepted by the
Ministry of Development, it is being utilized by the Cairo Governorate
as well as throughout other parts of the national government. In fact,
the study has been transformed, almost verbatim, into the Egyptian Five
Year Plan. In view of the fact that many government agencies have found
utility in the study, it is worthwhile to step back and examine the
course the NUPS study took, and in what manner it might have been
performed differently so as to have been better received and officially
adopted by the GOE. One of the easiest tasks of a post-mortem is to
criticize; however, I hope to offer some insights into the problems with
the NUPS effort and the way they might have been handled, which I hope
the reader will find informative.
It is important to take note of the fact that there was little
official GOE participation in this study. Since the Ministry of
Development was expecting an endorsement of the New Towns Policy for
development of remote areas and did not get it, it has never officially
accepted the NUPS study. Also, since the contractor was barred from
speaking with other ministries which should have been concerned with
urban policy development, there was no other official base of support
for the study when it was completed. Although the study did not totally
condemn the GOE Master Plan, there were significant issues raised
relating to scale, standards and velocity of development of New Towns.
The rejection by NUPS of large-scale, immediate development of remote
believed that the implicit attack on its primary thrust was a rejection
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of its entire Plan and, necessarily, an attack on its budget. Because
it had not participated in the study and because the multi-volume study
was not easy to read even in Arabic, the Ministry did not realize that
the recommendations focussed mainly upon the need for scaling down the
Plan. In addition, with the NUPS conclusions that the GOE was being
overly ambitious in its Plan, it was obvious that AID and World Bank
money would not be forthcoming for the programs to which the GOE had
given such strong support publicly.
The fact that the NUPS team was placed in a separate office outside
of any ministry; that only other American resident consultants to the
Ministry of Development actually had substantive contact with PADCO; and
that there was no significant AID support to facilitate better
communication between the contractor and relevant GOE ministries seems
tragic in retrospect. Unfortunately, the lack of participation by
ministry technicians constitutes a lost opportunity for training in
urban data collection and analysis which PADCO could have performed,
leaving that capability within the ministry.
The most obvious problem at the outset of NUPS' work was the fact
that the Ministry of Development was seeking a study to rubber stamp its
New Towns Policy. PADCO, the contractor was placed in the untenable
position of being hired to examine a plan and present recommendations
for action with which it knew the GOE might disagree if it was not an
endorsement of the New Towns Policy. AID was well aware of the
circumstances, yet the Cairo mission did not insist upon GOE
participation in the study, itself, which might have served to bring the
Egyptians along in the me thodology of the NUPS and al low them to draw
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the same conclusions that NUPS did, i.e., if Egypt follows the urban
plan it has set out for itself, that:
Even under the optimistic forecast of 7 percent annual real
growth in the economy and a substantial increase in
domestic saving, there will not be a sufficient capital
resource pool to implement all of the urban projects and
plans already drawn up or contemplated at their present
targets and standards;
The more rapid decentralization of the population across
the national space attempted, the higher will be the
investment costs per capita and the higher the risk of a
slowdown in the rate of economic growth; and
The higher the physical standards adopted in new
developments or upgrading older settlements or
neighborhoods, the more likely it becomes that substantial
segments of the population will receive little or no
benefit from the investment available in their lifetime and
the less likely it becomes that the government can recover
enough of its ignvestment to replenish the investment pool
in later years.
These dramatic conclusions, especially in black and white, caused
considerable discomfort within the GOE. Although the study was
translated into Arabic, it is conceivable that this direct, straight-
forward statement of the NUPS conclusions did little toward opening up
discussions on the content of the study. NUPS is very strong on the
economic side, but the lack of recognition on the part of the team that
its recommendations were a threat to the credibility of established
ministerial policy, assured that the study would not be accepted. In
fact, the responsibility for such sensitive negotiations on policy
reform should have rested with AID, perhaps forming part of its on-going
policy dialogue with the GOE. However, as AID mission leadership was in
flux and urban was not a priority area anyway, mission support for urban
policy reform took lower priority to policy dialogue on energy and food
subsidies in which AID had already been exerting considerable pressure.
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The information which NUPS collected and analyzed further pointed
out the various ministries' deficiencies in analysis and decision-
making, which did not endear the NUPS team to the very people whom the
study was to serve. The reasons the Ministry of Development had made
the decisions on existing urban policy and plans but, more importantly,
its inability to reverse some of those decisions in light of new
information due to political and cultural sensitivities that would cause
embarrassment, were not carefully considered by the NUPS team. By
stating the above-mentioned conclusions, the NUPS challenged the
recognized authority to rationalize its decisions. The credibility of
existing urban plans and policies was called into question and,
therefore, the legitimacy of the political actors also was called into
question.
The AID criteria of acceptance, impact, and do-ability, in a
politically-charged environment such as the contractor found during the
study, were not the criteria upon which the NUPS study was based. The
long lists of sensitive policy issues, deficiencies in every area of
urban endeavor, that PADCO found and put down on paper in voluminous
reports, were difficult for the Egyptians to accept. Policy reform
recommendations, such as were laid out by the NUPS study, required a
high level of support by both AID and the GOE since many of them
countermanded GOE policy decisions which had been taken by ministries,
and called for a reordering of resource allocation priorities to take
into account the cost-benefit analyses which NUPS had done, based upon
the Egyptians' own stated objectives. On paper, the NUPS solved the
Egyptian problem of interaction between the Egyptians' macroeconomic
growth projections and spatial growth. The more crucial problem of how
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the GOE would implement some of the suggested policy reforms without
causing significant social unrest and possible political disruption was
not addressed by NUPS nor by AID with the Egyptians in meetings which
should have occurred throughout the duration of the study.
It cannot be expected nor is it desirable that a contracted team of
technical experts deal with negotiating politically-sensitive policy
recommendations with a host country government. The NUPS policy study
is not the same as, for example, a technical study on road construction.
Issues of a policy nature, if they are to be accepted by a government,
require longer-term continuous discussion and debate at high levels than
do technical issues. Collaboration between the NUPS team and those upon
whom the study would have considerable impact did not exist. Because
those ministries who would be most greatly affected by the
implementation of NUPS recommendations did not realize that many
alternatives for action were also presented in the study, the document
was officially rejected at the ministerial level, but unofficially
accepted on the technical level for its enunciation of the various
choices for action, which were based on sound technical analyses. The
NUPS study calls upon the GOE to make difficult policy choices which
would have varying costs and benefits for all competing interests and
might not be the optimal choice for any one actor. Total cost
consequences of the existing combined set of spatial and sectoral plans;
the unrealistic objective of trying to implement them all; and the
opportunity costs in pursuing such a strategy, were made clear in the
study, the statement of which caused considerable uneasiness for GOE
officials.
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To summarize, the difficult policy areas of significant consequence
where the GOE would have to choose among its objectives are:
National economic growth versus inter-personal or inter-
regional equity;
Agricultural versus industrial and urban investment;
Mobilization of international versus domestic public and
private sector investment;
Upgrading and maintenance of existing urban structure
versus new development;
Maintenance of physical and spatial standards versus
individual and national affordability;
Willingness to intervene in urban land markets. 2
The major policy modifications that the NUPS study implies do not
meet the AID criterion of "do-ability." A three to five-year project
timeframe with conditions attached to it that imply policy widespread
reforms in such areas as wage structure, cost recovery, standards, or
land tenure, is not realistic. This criterion for activities not to be
"...overly burdened by policy or institutional constraints that would
seriously hinder implementation, ...(yet) contribute to achieving policy
reform" is internally inconsistent. If AID desires to finance projects
where it will not clash with Egyptian pricing policy distortions, then
it cannot expect those very same projects to contribute to policy reform
in any significant manner. Equally difficult to accomplish is a frontal
attack by the GOE on the deeply-entrenched agricul ture policies. The
artificially low agriculture prices set by the government are affordable
by the population whose wages are, on the main, also set at a very low
rate. However, these low prices discourage production and distort
resource allocations. The now infamous food riots of 1977, which
occurred when the government attempted to raise bread prices, is
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indicative of the extreme political sensitivity of these pricing policy
issues. A project which does not deal with adjusting prices to
farmers, however, is not likely to meet the AID "acceptance" criterion
on the U.S. side nor have a significant "impact" in the short-run.
The policy dialogue between the U.S. and Egypt concerns long-term
economic health and self-sufficiency. However, the role of AID in Egypt
is not like that of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.
The foreign policy objectives of the Agency, as described in Chapter II,
move AID to pursue policy reform with the GOE on a more friendly and
persuasive basis than one of confrontation. The AID funded widespread
training of economists in every sector of the GOE, in the long-run, will
assist the GOE, itself, in reaching appropriate' investment decisions.
In the meantime, although the ability of AID to exert pressure for
policy reform is limited by Congressionally-mandated funding levels.
The GOE, however, realizes even though AID has its political objectives,
it also has development objectives and it will not fund projects which
are uneconomic (such as the New Towns or Desert Reclamation projects).
When AID is able, it will seek to assist a recipient country in
furthering that country's political objectives, but if technical
analysis shows that meeting those objectives is economically infeasible,
AID assistance will be placed in more viable investments.
Recently, in an evaluation of "lessons learned" in institution-
building, the Cairo AID Mission confronted some important issues head-
on. AID's culturally-laden expectations of the manner and speed with
which an institution should develop cannot easily be applied across
countries, at least not West to East and probably not North to South.
The evaluation notes that, aside from timing and approach to
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institution-building, there needs to be an agreement between AID and the
recipient country as to the importance of any particular reform measure.
This problem is exemplifiei by AID's private sector development
policy and AID's push for Egypt to rely on market forces to determine
the feasibility of a project. The Mission writes:
...Based on decades of socialism and millenia of
centralized, autocratic government, Egyptians often may not
perceive the development of private sector institutions and
market mechanisms as a desirable or necessary objective.
The Egyptian perspective stands in striking contrast to
AID's Western perspective, based on a history of several
centuries of capitalism and individual initiatives.3
The conclusion the mission draws is that different outlooks on how
to accomplish development objectives must be tolerated if incremental
change is to be pursued. In addition, since strict requirements for
policy reform may not be met by the GOE due to potential social and
political disruption, AID should be flexible as to how much change it
requires.
The immense problems of management and administration which beset
Egyptian institutions will not be solved in the timeframe of a typical
AID project activity, especially considering the six areas that have
been identified by AID which would increase availability of productive
jobs and improve the quality of the labor force:
1. Improving the Functioning of the Urban Markets
reform interest rate policy
improve risk management
improve the working of both formal and informal
credit institutions in urban areas
2. Improving the Functioning of Urban Labor Markets
assist in development of wage policies to aid more
efficient labor allocation
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assist government to reduce regulatory practices
that hamper private sector activities
improve transportation networks and land use in
order to reduce the costs for workers
3. Improving the Working of Municipal Government
assist municipal governments to improve planning
capability for infrastucture projects in terms of
design, implementation, and maintenance
increase the use of the private sector in the
provision of goods and services
set prices of public urban services at marginal
costs
improve land. tenure security in informal areas so
as to encourage investment and provide collateral
4. Improving the Productivity of the Private Sector
provide infrastructure to maximize output and
employment impact
provide access to informal sector activities
5. Improving Human Capital Activities
promote activities in education, health, family
planning and vocational training
6. Improving the Overall Allocation of Resources
promote macroeconomic and sectoral policy reforms
bring relative prices closer to relative
opportunity costs in such areas as food prices and
public services. 4
The words "reform," "assist," and "improve" are a strong component
of these stated areas requiring AID attention. The Agency realizes that
it cannot possibly seek to fund improvements in all these areas with its
limited resources, so its largest planned efforts focus on
infrastructure, improving human capital, and municipal government
development. Because the Agency does not have enough influence on
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Egyptian policies which distort the economic situation of the country,
sticky issues such as user fees for public services are subordinated due
to the necessity of completing visible, large water projects which will
have significant social impact but, more importantly, have been
requested at the highest political levels. AID's criterion of Egyptian
acceptance is met here, but it does raise the question of whether, in
its desire to avoid conflict in the Egypt program, AID has concentrated
too much of its funds in a few non-contentious sectors of lesser
priority for overall economic development.
To borrow from Charles E. Lindblom's rational decision model, AID
decision-makers, in determining projects to fund, would:
1. Identify problems;
2. Clarify goals and then rank them as to their
importance;
3. List all possible means or policies for achieving each
of those goals;
4. Assess all the costs of and the benefits that would
seem to follow from each of the alternative policies;
and
5. Select the package of goals and associated policies
that would bring the greatest relative benefits and the
least relative disadvantages. 5
The difficulty with this model for AID decision-makers is that
there are so many Egyptians and American problems to deal with, the
goals and policies are difficult to clarify and they are not merely
those of AID. Decisions are affected by all the political actors and
interest groups mentioned in Chapter II, in addition to the recipient
government's political actors and interest groups. The problem with
this model is that nowhere does Lindblom examine the strong political
forces which impact upon this decision-making process. When the various
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competing interests are taken into account and national objectives are
weighed, one against the other, the situation then becomes one of
choosing among the alternatives, or "satisficing."
Sharkansky, in discussing Lindblom's model, describes precisely the
action that was taken by AID decision-makers with regard to NUPS
recommendations. "Administrators define problems, goals, and policies
that do not reveal a marked departure from existing activities and that
do not provoke challenge from those inside or outside the organization
who might object to any explicit goals they had not already learned to
tolerate."6  Caiden and Wildavsky, portray development policies as
being "expressed in financial allocations and project selection ...made
through administrative maneuvering, political compromise, and
institutional rivalries influenced more directly by immediate pressures
and constraints than by long-range planning." 7 In an ideal world, it is
Lindblom's model which one would want to follow. Unfortunately, the
reality of the world of development more closely approximates that of
Sharkansky and Caiden and Wildavsky.
It is difficult to decide which decision-maker Caiden and Wildavsky
more accurately describe -- AID, the GOE, or both. The difficul ties
faced by AID in attempting to promote Egyptian government policy reform
are endless. The Agency has been placed in the unenviable position of
having American foreign policy objectives dictate the amount of aid
funds being made available to Egypt (as well as many other countries),
which gives AID little leverage on policy matters. Highest priority
development choices are, perhaps, giving way to political choices for
projects of lesser development importance under the Congressional
pressures of having to obligate $1.0 billion per year for Egypt. When
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AID is unable to make an impact on policy questions, it does whatever it
can that will meet some development objectives, since Congress has
authorized the money and the Egyptians realize they will get all the
authorized funds in the end, albeit for lesser priority programs such as
commodities.
The position AID is taking is that of capturing the positive
dynamics which exist in Egyptian society in order to arrive at a
solution for spending the money Congress has authorized, while still
meeting some basic economic development criteria, rather then being
bullish on the policy reform issues. The criteria of acceptance, impact
and do-ability may not lead AID to select its highest priority projects
for funding; however, the short-run considerations of the political
environment, which are rarely openly discussed, must realistically guide
the AID decision-making process. The lack of discussion by AID of
political issues in its literature may be explained by the fact that
politics is an ever-present factor upon which economic and technical
considerations are overlaid. That assumption allows AID to proceed with
its work of economic development within the political boundaries which
have been all but predetermined for the Agency. Of course, field
missions do have a modicum of power over the extent to which certain
policies will take precedence over others, but the level of autonomy
which the Agency has, on the whole, is limited.
In drawing some conclusions about the criteria and the process of
decision-making by AID and the amount of control the Agency has over
those decisions, examination of the Egypt case directed me toward
several major issues that apply across many countries and can be seen
across donor agencies. Kil lick, in his examination of "The
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Possibilities of Development Planning," for developing countries
encapsulizes those issues:
Decision-making in the face of major social divisions
becomes a balancing act rather than a search for optima.
The process of conflict resolution in which social
tranquility and the maintenance of power is a basic concern
rather than the maximization of the rate of growth or some
such ... economic objectives, including development, are
likely to come lower in the pecking order of government
concerns than the case for development planning implicitly
assumes... 8
The use of aid as an American foreign policy instrument, as opposed
to a purely economic development tool has, by its very nature, forced
the Agency to support projects which, though beneficial to a country in
economic terms, have a far higher priority in terms of political impact
in a country. My motivation for undertaking this analysis of AID-
giving, was to examine the economic, technical and political inputs to
the decision-making process in order to determine the roles of those
inputs in the process. I found what I had expected that it is
impossible to divorce the political from the economic considerations in
making aid decisions, which was not a revelation of any major
significance. The choice by AID of the path of least resistance on
policy reform, however, is a much more interesting finding.
The vast amount of foreign assistance flowing to Egypt from the
U.S., places AID in an ideal position to use those resources to
encourage significant policy reform. The fact that the Agency has been
given extraordinarily high, politically-motivated funding levels
provides Egypt with an opportunity to make unprecedented economic gains.
The purpose in funding the NUPS study was to determine what urban
problems would lend themselves to AID programs. However, Congress has
put AID in a position which makes it extremely difficult to use those
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funds to promote economic policy reform and to turn around the ailing
Egyptian economy. Moreover, since the Egyptians are aware that the funds
will be forthcoming whether or not they move to reform economic policy
distortions, the Egyptians can continue to implement programs which
promote short-run political gain instead of long-run development goals.
In addition, AID has tied its own hands by placing time constraints on
projects, making it nearly impossible for the Agency to contribute to
policy reform.
Under the dual constraints of the Egyptian-American political
relationship and the entrenched economic policies of the GOE, it would
not be just to judge AID too harshly for emphasizing infrastructure,
rather than tackling tougher policy issues. The decision to finance
water and sewerage projects assists the GOE in meeting an obvious
development need. With water mains breaking regularly in Cairo, the
potential for health hazards are widespread. The GOE does, indeed,
have to improve its water and sewerage systems if it is to avert a
domestic crisis. The proposed Del ta Secondary Cities project will seek
to improve planning capabilities in areas where the NUPS study
determined assistance is warranted, though it remains to be seen to what
extent policy reform will be undertaken in this project. Improvements
in waste disposal will meet a growing health concern, especially around
the major metropolitan regions and, though not a priority area, will
contribute to improved functioning of the major cities. One of the
most important consequences of having funded the NUPS study, is that
there is now a document which lays out for the Egyptians what the impact
will be of following their current policies. Some modifications of
policy in the Ministry of Planning have already taken place as a
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result. Projects by the World Bank, the French, and the German
governments have utilized the NUPS study, and it is almost certain that
the detailed sector analyses prepared by NUPS will be incorporated into
future planning efforts. Most importantly, if the GOE moves forward in
incrementally implementing some of the NUPS recommendations, AID and
other donor financing will be made available to assist them in carrying
out economically viable projects.
My analysis of political/economic-technical balance in the
decision-making process has lead me to conclude that if AID's clear
objective is economic development, then the Agency is hampered by the
fact that it also must serve as an instrument of foreign policy and,
thus, must meet political objectives as well. How AID might strike a
more acceptable balance in terms of economic development relative to its
political mandate is a difficult problem, when funding of the Agency is
controlled by those whose primary interest is non-economic. I would
support three possible actions which AID could take in order to further
the economic development goals of the Agency while, at the same time,
fulfilling its political objectives.
The first action would consist of making the case to Congress that
the Agency must have more autonomy over its own decisions. This would
take the form of a briefing for members of Congress on the economic
consequences of AID programs where AID is given little autonomy in
funding decisions and, indeed, is required to spend all the funds which
are authorized, with economic and technical criteria being secondary.
In its draft Strategic Plan, the Agency states that it:
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... is in a unique position to enter into policy dialogue
with host country governments. Given our commitment to
overcoming the worst aspects of poverty and our approach to
development we bring a distinct perspective to policy
discussions. The point of such dialogue is to achieve
agreement on the nature of key policy constraints to basic
development and on practical changes that can be made with
support from AID and other donors. The adequacy of the
policy framework will be an important consideration in
Agency funding decisions on program and project proposals.
Special attention also is given to energy supply, pricing
and distributional policies because of the linkages between
energy uses and economic development and the achievement of
basic human needs. 9
The briefing would make the case the draft Strategic Plan makes for
utilization of foreign aid to promote policy reforms where appropriate
and, where AID is not given the autonomy to have significant impact on
the process for such reforms, it would make the case that direct
budgetary support to politically strategic countries should be made.
The latter form of assistance would assist the recipient country and, at
the same time, remove AID from the position of "encouraging" policy
reform without the wherewithal to do so.
Even in cases where policy reform will be difficult to accomplish,
studies of the magnitude and importance of NUPS should be undertaken,
but only with full participation of host country officials and technical
staff. It is important to note that, although beset with problems of
acceptance by the Egyptian government, the NUPS study has served as
valuable input to the Egyptian decision-making process. It has been
difficult for the GOE to ignore NUPS findings that indicate current
policies are not entirely rational nor do they make economic sense.
Data collection and analysis leading to many of the current policies and
plans in Egypt were weak, so the information which NUPS has provided has
been important to the Egyptians.
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The NUPS team was given the task of not only determining whether
the New Towns Policy made sense, but also of laying out for AID and the
GOE what the options for an appropriate urban policy would consist of.
To the extent that AID has relationships with most ministries, the fact
that the mission was not willing to intercede and secure GOE cooperation
on the study and concurrence in its results, reflects a lack of
commitment which may be attributable to either the priority of the urban
sector at the mission level or a sense that the Agency gives limited
priority to urban activities as a result of Congressional directives.
This, plus the fact that the pressure on the GOE by AID for policy
reform in energy and food supports was already quite strong, may have
caused the mission to retreat from exerting pressure for reform in yet
another sensitive policy area.
The necessity exists for making a stronger case to Congress for
urban development projects, especially as defined in terms of the AID
priority areas of health and family planning, education and agriculture
(with urban dwellers having sufficient access to agricultural outputs at
affordable prices). Recognizing that the process of urban development
is becoming at least as or more important than rural development in many
countries, will be crucial if economic development is to continue in a
manner compatible with development reality. The attitude which has been
taken, i.e., to permit the World Bank to finance the majority of the
urban projects, will not be sufficient once urban problems become so
horrendous that they overshadow rural ones. Just as AID expects
developing country governments to approach their economic development
problems in an integrated fashion with regard to both rural and urban
development, so, too, should AID begin to implement its economic
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assistance program to more closely reflect that same development
balance.
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ANNEX 1
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Table I
TOTAL A.I.D. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE URBAN DEVELOPE\NT PROJECTS,
1949- 1970
Region
Latin \jerica
Africa
Near East and South Asia
East Asia
.Non-regional
TOTAL
Number
Countries
18
10
11
6
45
Number
Projects
70
22
28
21
4
145
Expenditures
$33,136,000
9,874,000
9,186,000
4,740,000
736 ,000
$57,672 ,000
Source All Tables: Cooley, Stephen W., Agency for International Development Technical
Assistance for Urban Development, A Study of Agency Experience, 1949-
1970, June, 1971, Technical Assistance Bureau, AID, Washington.
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Table II
A. I.D. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE URBAN DEVEL0PMENT PROJECTS IN LATIN AME.RICA
Country Project Number Title
Date
Completed
Expenditure
(Thousand $)*
ARGENTINA
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
ERIT.HOND.
CHILE
COLO' IBIA
COSTA RICA
510-11-820-035 Housing
511-11-890-111 Internal Migration & !sng.
511-11-640-319 Urban Schools Construction
511-11-750-604 Urban Property Reassess.
512-11-830-011 Housing
512-11-830-107 Housing
512-11-830-108 Housing - NE
512-11-830-264 Nat'l. Hsng. Bank
512-11-840-264 Self-help l1sng.
512-11-710-039 Sao Paulo Admin.
512-11-720-122.9 Munic.& State Admin.
512-15-810-125 Urban Self-help
512-15-830-264 Urban Planning Dev.
512-11-310-106 Roads - NE
(512-11-520-062 Nat'l.Water & Sewer
(512-11-520-062.1 Urban Water & S.Syst.
505-11-890-005
513-11-770-217
513-11-830-059
513-15-830-026
513-15-830-257
513-11-750-143
513-11-750-152
513-11-320-144
514-15- 810-154
514-11-830-012
515-11-520-915
515-11-790-004
515-11-720-060
515-11-830-063
Hsng. Dev.
Pub.Admin.& Urban Dev.
Hsng. Servicio
housing
Urban Planning & Dev.
Dev. Planning Org.
Regional Planning
Transportation Planning
Decentralized Dev.
Urban & Rural Hsng.
Munic. Sewerage
Munic. Gov. Admin.
Dev. Planning & Admin.
Hsng.& City Planning
6/70
9/58
7/64
6/69
6/60
6/65
6/66
('71)
'67
6/58
('72)
'70
6/67
('72)
12/64
('74)
6/55
6/64
10/66
6/67
('75)
6/59
6/61
6/61
'70
4/64
77
332
45
800
219
64
8
35
973
21
12
-)
359
1584
3100
101
39
150
906
149
209
0
235
27
1998
325
Table II Cont.
Project Number Title
518-15-995-074 Town Planning
518-15-910-048 Dev. Center
518-15-890-092.3 Urban Dev.
518-11-660-088 Central Univ. - Quito
518-11-660-089 Catholic Univ. - Quito
518-11-660-090 Guayaquil Univ.
518-15-840-014 Housing
Date
Completed
6/68
12/62
('73)
'69
'69
'69
7/54
Expenditure
(Thousand $)*
383
70
2774
1285
1162
53
EL SALVADOR
GUATE 'ALA
I IONDURAS
NI CARAGUA
PANAM IA
PERU
SURINM
TRIN.& TOB.
URUGUAY
519-11-830-089 Housing Finance
519-11-720-051 Dev. Planning
519-11-840-054 Urban Facilities Planning
520-11-760-146 Public Finance & Planning
520-11-650-139 Urban Educ.
520-11-690-137 Urban Educ.
520-11-790.-176.2 Public Admin.5 Munic.Pl.
520-11-830-047 Housing
520-11-830-081 Housing
520-11-830-081 Housing
520-11-340-037 Harbor Oper.& Admin.
522-11-995-039 Public Admin.& Munic.Gov.
522-11-995-074 Coop. Dev. Savings
522-11-995-074.3 Coop.Dev.Hsng.
524-11-830-039
524-11-870-003
525-15-840-045
525-15-460-105
525-15-995-095
525-15-899-119
[525-15-810-117
[525-15-810-121
(525-15-810-122
527-11-330-065
527-11-540-934
508-11-810-003
533-11-830-040
523-11-830-014
Comprehensive Phy.Planning
City Planning
Assistance for Housing
Urban Dev.Project (Labor)
Urban Master Planning
Urban Dev.
Cammunity Dev. Foundation
Nat'l. Ccmmunity Dev.
Nat'l. Volunteer Service
Hsng.5 Urban Dev.
San Marcos Med.School
Housing
Iousing & Planning
Hsng.Mortgage Finance Co.
10/65
6/69
5/66
12/68
6/56
6/64
('71)
12/61
6/61
6/64
6/56
('73)
('73)
('71)
2/63
3/61
6/68
6/67
'68
('73)
('74)
.'70
'68
6/65
6/64
7/67
78
Country
ECUADOR
29
1013
57
821
18
580
1189
430
2562
1075
6
902
87
108
241
141
956
823
487
2280
241
178
14
Tablc II Cont.
Country Proj cct Numnber Title
Date
Completed
Expenditurc
(Thousand $)*
529-15-830-017
LA REGIONAL 529-15-830-017
598-15-260-440
598-15-810-114
598-15-830-444
18 Countries
Housing F; Urban Renewal
Housing
Nat'l. Markets
Approach to Urban Dev.
Urban Dev.
70 Projects
* As of June 30, 1970
79
VTNEZUELA '71
6/65
'70
'66
12/66
47n
798
157
23.
33,136
Table III
A. I. D. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN AFRICA
Country Project Number
CAMEROON
GiANA
EflfIOPIA
IVORY COAST
LIBERIA
MOROCCO
dIGERIA
631-11-310-009
631-11-990-001
641-11-390-042
663-11-810-081
681-11-840-035
669-11-720-068
669-11-920-069
669-11-520-075
669-11-740-083
669-11- 830-019
608-11-860-025
620-11-610-736
620-11-830-711
620-11-830-763
Title
Fann to Market Roads
Urban Dev.
Sector Transp.Studies
Land Res.& Camnunity Dev.
Low Cost Housing
Nat' 1.Planning Agency
Dev. Banking
Monrovia Sewerage
Public Utilities Mgt.
Public Bldg.& Housing
City Plan: Agadir
Ibadan Tech. College
East Nigeria HHFA
Nat'l. HHFA
RHODESIA/NYASA 614-11-120-071 Land-Use Planning
SONLALI REP. 649-11-340-021 ogadiscio Port
SUDAN
AFR. REGION
650-11-310-056
650-11-660-085
650-11-520-060
618-11-660-609
698-11-890-101
698-11-890-134
Date
Completed
'67
6/65
6/68
6/57
'68
6/66
6/61
6/65
6/70
6/58
6/61
'68
'67
12/67
6/60
8/67
4/67
'71
12/67
4/66
7/67
?67
Khartoum-Port Sudan Hwy.
Univ. iartoum
Khartoum North Sewerage Pl.
Nairobi Eng. Faculty
Conference on Hsng.Fin.
Hsng.Supervisory Inspect.
Expenditure
(Thousand $)*
658
311
5
56
147
694
12
45
887
175
87
2280
545
91
7
1597
837
791
90
120
14
425
10 Countries 22 Projects
*\s of June 30 , 1970
9,874
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Table IV
A. I.D. TEC-NICAL ASSISTANCE URBAN DEVELOP.MFNT PROJECTS IN NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
Country Project Number Title
Date
Completed
Expenditure
(Thousand $)*
AFGIANISTAIN
CEYLON
INDIA
GREECE
IRkN
JORDAN
LEBANON
PAKISTAN
TURKEY
YEM-% EN
NEWSA PEGION
306-11-680-030
306-11-680-013
383-11-660-006
383-11-720-028
386-11-830-013
386-11-840-014
386-11-690-028
386-11-870-373
240-11- 830-065
265-11-710-113
265-11-910-109
265-11-520-013
265-11-790-239
265-11-820-077
266-11-610-025
278-15-990-078
268-15-690-052
268-11-520-116
268-11-540-079
391-11-220-161
391-11-520-079
391-11-660-220
277-11-220-243
277-11-340-308
277-11-720-368
277-11-990-362
279-15-810-011
298-11-830-011
Kabul Univ.Admin.
Kabul Univ. Improvement
Univ. Ceylon
Dept.Nat' 1. Planning
Building Materials Dev.
.Low Cost Hsng.
New Dehli Regional Health
q Sanitation Survey
Reg. Dev. Plan
Labor Hsng.
6/64
('71)
6/64
4/62
6/61
6/57
6/66
8/68
6/59
Munic. Mgt. 6/64
Ind. Dev. Center 6/65
Bandar Abas Water Supply 3/53
Village, Town & Province Dev. 6/66
Tehran Munic.Dev. 6/57
Baghdad University
Munic. Loan Fund
Tripoli Commnzity Dev.Sch.
Tripoli Water Supply
Tripoli General Sanitation
Kanachi Elec. Supply
Munic. Water Supply
Peshawar Univ.
Istanbul Arterial
Seaport Oper.
Dev. Planning
Cukurova Planning
Urban & Rural Dev.
Regional Hsng.Office
6/68
6/64
6/54
4/61
6/58
12/65
6/62
'68
6/57
6/65
6/67
6/67
6/58
11 Countries 28 Projects
*As of June 30, 1970
81
245
806
978
5
199
47
12
20
27
354
945
50
82
15
527
2,795
1
6
6
2
77
450
79
234
287
150
741
46
9,186
Table V
A. I.D. TECINICAL ASSISTANCE URAN DEVELOPNTDN PRCJECTS~IN EAST ASIA
Country Project Number
Date
ComletedTitle
xpcncliture
(Thousani $1*
REP. CHINA
INDJTESIA
A. REA
LAOS
PHILIPPINES
T iAI LAND
484-11-330-158
484-11-790-295
484-11- 810-161
484-11-340-118
484-11-370-574
497-11-340-082
497-11-830-057
489-15-320- 232
489-11- 330-600
489-11-830-449
489-13-330-528
489-15-330-582
489-11-370-653
439-11-290-053
492-11-390-087
492-11-270-035
492-11-660-070
492-11- 830-214
492-11-480-031
493-11-310-154
493-11-310-155
Low Cost Hsng.
Munic. Gov.Admin.
Urban & Ind.Survey
Port Oper.& Mgt.
Modernizing Taipei
Port & Harbor Training
Low Cost Hsng.
Urban Transit Street Car
Hwy.-R.R.Ports & Harbors
I'sng.Research Dev.
Hsng. Finance Cons truction
I sng. Finance Constr.Plan
Urban Dev.
Ind. Dev. Center
Transportation Survey
Ind. Dev. Center
Univ. of Philippines
Urban Planning
Workers Isng.
Bangkok-Nakhon Phanom Hwy.
Korat-Nong Khai Hwy.
9/61
6/58
3/57
3/58
5/67
9/56
6/60
6/59
6/69
11/61
Plan 6/62
6/65
'69
6/62
6/57
6/68
6/68
('71)
6/54
12/65
12/60
6 Countries 21 Projects,
*As of June 30, 1970
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S
8
3
244
8
229
260
162
167
44
15
31
13
2 ,021
1,350
3 0
4
11
43
4,740
82
---------- - Iq
Table VI
A. I.D. NON-REGIONAL TECINICAL ASSISTANG URBAN DEVELOPMENT PR3JECTS
Project Number
901-11-690-217
931-17- 290-438
931-17- 890-416
931-17- 890-440
Date
CampletedTitle
Urban Community 11/67
Cost of Urb.Infrastructure '68
Relation of Investment in '67
Housing to Econ.Growth
Urban HIsng. - Latin America '70
Expenditure
(Thousand 3)*
101
244
164
227
4 Projects
* As of June 30, 1970
Sponsor
OPC
TAE
736
83
wo
Table VII
TOTAL A. I. D. TECNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR URBAN DEVELOPT:
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES BY REGION AND TYPE OF ACrIVITY
Type of
Activity
Housing
Plannin0
Nunicipal Administration
Urban Community Development
Urban Education
Urban Transportation
Urban Services
Other
TOTAL COUNTRIES*
Latin
America
9
5
4
3
3
4
18
Near East
Africa South Asia
3
3
0
2
2
4
2
1
10
2
3
1
3
5
1
4
_2
11
East
Asia
4
2
1
1
1
5
0
6
Total
Countrics*
24
17
7
11
12
13
9
10
45
*Unduplicated count
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ANNEX 2
A. Core UDA (Urban Development Assessment)
[The following should be included in all types of UDAs. The amount of
material listed here as essential for a core UDA may seem exceedingly
large. However, these Guidelines envisage a limited depth of analysis for
these core subjects and issues. Experience to date suggests that, given the
availability of a reasonable amount of secondary data from U.S and in-
country sources (including interview information), basic data collection,
analysis, and writing for any one of the items below can be done in as
little as three person-days. No more than about one person-week need be
spent on any single item in a core UDA, unless it is an issue of special
focus.]
1. Describe the country's demographic and economic development context.
a. National population trends (including migration).
b. Economic development situation and trends.
* Economic growth.,
* Sectoral structure of production and labor force.
c. National economic development policies.
2. Describe the country's urban structure and trends.
a. Urban growth overall and by city.
b. Structure of the settlement system.
* Distribution of urban population by city size.
* Functions of regions and cities.
c. Spatial distribution of the resource base and economic activities.
d. Income levels and income distribution of the urban population.
3. Describe the institutional framework for urban policy-making planning,
management, and delivery of services and briefly comment on the
effectiveness of the various institutions.
a. Political/administrative structure.
b. Inventory of institutions involved in urban planning, management
and services.
c. Public finance system.
Source: "Guidelines for Preparing Urban Development Assessment,"
Office of Housing and Urban Programs, Agency for International
Development, Washington, April, 1984.
85
In reviewing national urban policy-making and programming, particular
attention should be given to: (1) whether there are any institutions
capable of bridging the gap between national economic planning and
spatial investment planning/programming and (2) the extent to which
urban development plans prepared at the national level take into
account the financial/economic implications and the feasibility of imple-
mentation.
Provide suggestions on improving the national-level institutional capacity
to carry out urban or spatial planning and on making national urban
planning more responsive to financial and institutional realities.
4. Briefly review national urban and spatial policies (explicit and implicit)
and comment on the degree to which their objectives are being met.
This review should include:
a. Aspects of the national economic development plan related to urban
areas.
b. Industrial development policies.
c. Agricultural policies.
d. Regional development policies and programs.
e. Political/administrative decentralization.
f. National transport plans or programs.
5. Assess the general physical conditions of the principal urban areas.
Focus particularly on the situation of the urban poor. Examine the
roles of the public private sectors (formal and informal). This review
should cover:
a. Housing: Shelter conditions of the urban population; the main
problems of housing supply and affordability
b. Infrastructure: Proportion of the urban population served by water
supply systems, sanitation systems, electric power, and drainage
systems; the main problems of supply and affordability in each
category
c. Services: Proportion of the urban population served by public
transport, health facilities, schools, and solid waste collection;
main problems of supply and affordaitility in each category
d. Land: The availability of land for future urban growth and, in par-
ticular, lower-income residential development; the major problems
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of land availability (e.g., price, tenure, standards, physical
unsuitability, etc.); the major problems of urban land management.
6. Review problems and opportunities related to urban employment
nationally with particular attention to the following:
a. The rate at which national economy is creating urban jobs.
b. The trend in urban job growth versus labor force growth.
c. The kinds of urban jobs being created.
* Sectors of employment (industry, services, commerce, etc.).
* Public vs. private.
* Formal vs. informal.
d. The places (cities or regions) where most urban jobs are being
created.
e. National' economic policies and programs affecting urban job
creation.
Provide general recommendations on measures to simulate more urban
job creation, especially in the private sector.
7. Assess the availability of public and private financial resources for
investment in urban development, focusing on:
a. The rate at which investment resources (public and private) for
urban development have been growing.
b. The rates at which urban investment has been transformed into
urban GDP growth and urban job growth.
c. The key sources of investment in urban development (e.g.,
domestic savings, export earnings, taxes, foreign assistance).
d. The prospects for additional resource mobilization for urban deve-
lopment.
e. Impediments, if any, to private sector investment in urban
enterprise or service delivery.
Provide general recommendations on alternative means to stimulate
investment resource mobilization for urban development.
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8. Review the spatial allocation of national investment (public and pri-
vate) among urban vs. rural areas and among cities and regions. This
analysis should cover:
a. Trends in the spatial allocation of investment.
b. The policies and objectives these trends have reflected (e.g., pri-
mate city dominance, "fair-share" allocation, social or cultural
biases, economic efficiency, alleviation of geographical inequities).
c. The cities or regions that have benefitted most from past invest-
ment allocation patterns.
d. Current government spatial investment policies, if any, and the
prospects these policies have for achieving their objectives.
e. Whether public policies are encouraging or discouraging private
investment in certain locations.
Provide general recommendations on a framework for urban investment
nationally. Identify cities or regions that should be given priority for
investment on the basis of (1) their potential contribution to national
economic development or (2) fostering greater geographical equity.
9. Provide an indication of what urban development objectives the nation
can realistically hope to achieve given the investment resources likely
to be available in the forseeable future. Focus this analysis on:
a. The kinds and levels of urban development investments that can be
made over the next five, ten, or twenty years.
OR [AID determines most appropriate focus]
b. The degree to which investment can be shifted away from the pri-
mate city and allocated to secondary cities as part of a decentra-
lization strategy, without causing an unacceptable decline in
national economic growth.
Evaluate the relevance of the following factors on the "affordability" of
possible urban development objectives: (1) the eansts of job creation in
different locations; (2) the opportunity cost and political feasibility of
shifting investment resources away from rural areas; (3) the cost
implications of varying physical standards for urban development pro-
jects; and (4) prospects for growth of urban investment resources.
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B. National UDA
[The following are "optional" issues that may be covered in a national UDA,
which is essentially an expansion of the core material outlined above.]
1. Review the current national development plan and determine the extent
to which it deals with urbanization explicitly. Asss - h-- er the pln
allocates a "reasonable" share of productive and supportive investment
to urban areas or urban populations. Suggest general approaches to
modifying the next development plan to better accomplish national urban
development objectives.
2. Assess the measures taken to date to carry out political/administrative
decentralization. Give particular attention to:
a. How effective the measures have been.
b. The urban development objectives that may be furthered by delega-
tion of political/administrative authority to provincial and municipal
governments.
c. The financial and budgetary reforms that should accompany
decentralization efforts.
d. The institutional reforms and assistance local governments need in
order to take on new responsibilities.
Provide recommendations on the types of policy changes, legal and
regulatory reforms and institutional-- changes needed to implement a
coherent decentralization strategy.
3. Evaluate public finance at the national level as it affects urban deve-
lopment, focusing on:
a. The extent to which certain sectors of the economy may be under-
taxed relative to their size in comparison with other countries.
b. Whether there are subsidies to urban populations that should be
re-evaluated.
Give suggestions on potential ways of mobilizing more public resources
for urban development.
4. Review the ways in which existing policies and institutions limit the
effectiveness of urban shelter and infrastructure provision to lower-
income groups. Specific attention should be given to:
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a. Strengths and weaknesses of the capital market system.
b. Adequacy of physical design standards.
c. The financial status and practices of shelter and infrastructure
institutions.
d. The planning and implementation capacity of these institutions.
Provide recommendations on how the delivery of urban shelter and
infrastructure might be improved to accomplish (1) economic develop-
ment ' objectives (programming investments where they will make the
greatest contribution -to economic growth); or (2) equity objectives
(supplying lower-income urban dwellers with affordable shelter and
infrastructure on a financially sound basis).
C. Regional UDA
[The first three items below should be included in all regional UDAs].
1. Regional profile: briefly describe the following (if not already covered
in the core material):
a. Population and demographic trends in the region.
b. Natural resources and economic base.
c. The region's settlement system.
* Spatial distribution of population in the region.
* Functions of the main cities and towns.
d. Urban infrastructure and services.
e. Institutional framework for development in the region.
* National agencies represented in the region.
* Provincial-level government structure.
* Municipal-level government structure.
2. Present an overview of the role of the region in national development,
focusing on the following:,.
a. The official development objectives for the region.
b. The region's contribution to the mtional economy.
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c. Comparison of the region's income, structure of production and
employment, output, and infrastructure with those of other
regions.
d. Extent to which the region has benefitted or been hurt by national
development policies.
3. Review briefly the strengths and weaknesses of regional institutions
with respect to urban development in the areas of policy making,
planning, programming and budgeting, public finance, and implementa-
tion.
[The following are "optional" issues for inclusion in a regional UDA]
4. Assess the extent to which economic development in the region could
be stimulated through investments in urban settlements. If this is
feasible, provide recommendations on:
a. Which cities and towns in the region should be the focus of
investments to promote economic growth.
b. What types of investments would be most appropriate.
5. Analyze the potential for stimulating rural development in the region by
strengthening urban functions in one or more settlements. Provide
recommendations on the usefulness of and scope for investments in:
a. Urban-based agricultural production support facilities (e.g., for
marketing and storage).
b. Agro-processing facilities.
c. Urban-based service facilities (e.g., credit outlets, input
suppliers, schools, clinics).
6. Evaluate the potential for generating non-farm employment in the
region. Specifically, assess the viability of:
a. Strengthening institutional support and services for enterprise deve-
lopment (e.g., cottage industry).
b. Providing skill training to the local population.
Provide preliminary recommendations for action (programs or institu-
tional development) or further study.
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D. City UDA
[The first three it-ems below should be included in all city UDAs].
1. City profile: briefly describe the following based on available date
disaggregated to the city level:
a. Population trends.
b. Economic base and production structure.
c. Employment characteristics.
d. Shelter, infrastructure and services.
e. Institutional structure for city planning, management and provision
of services.
2. Present a brief overview of the role of the city in national ani
regional development, focusing on the following:
a. The city's contributions to the national and regional economies.
b. The functions the city performs in relation to the nation and the
region.
c. How the city compares with others in terms of income, structure
of production and employment, output, infrastructure and social
services.
d. The extent to which the city has benefitted or been hurt by
national development policies.
3. Review in summary fashion the strengths and weaknesses of city instit-
tutions in the areas of policy-making, planning, programming ana
budgeting, public finance, and implementation. Provide recome -
mendations on technical assistance and training that could be provided
to improve city planning and management; also, make preliminary
suggestions on institutional changes that should be considered in city
management and administration.
[The following are "optional" issues for inclusion in a city UDA]
4. Assess the city's potential for economic development and job general
tion. Examine in particular:
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a. The structure of city's industrial base, including private and public
sector roles, types and sizes of enterprises, and the markets for
which they produce.
b. Apparent bottlenecks for large, medium, and small-scale industrial
development including policy questions, labor force, infrastructure,
services, mna"gerial skills, credit, training, etc.
c. Structure and development potential of other productive sectors
(commerce, services, government, construction, etc.).
Provide suggestions on how the city can use its comparative advantages
to develop economically.
5. Assess the adequacy of shelter delivery for the city's lower-income
population. Focus particularly on:
a. Shelter conditions.
b. Shelter financing systems.
c. Physical standards and affordability.
d. Institutional capacity of the public and private sectors to supply
shelter on a financially sound basis to lower-income urban house-
holds.
Provide general recommendations on policy, regulatory, and institutional
changes needed to improve shelter conditions for the city's lower-
income population; also, suggest further studies needed to generate
specific action proposals;
6. Evaluate the adequacy of infrastructure and services in the city in
terms of:
a. Constraints on economic development.
OR [AID selects primary emphasis]
b. Living conditions of the lower-income population.
This review may include water supply, sanitation, drainage, electric
power, public transport, health and education facilities, and solid
waste collection.
Provide general recommendations on policy, regulatory, and institutional
changes needed to improve urban infrastructure and services; also,
suggest further studies needed to generate specific action proposals.
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7. Review the city's public finance situation, focusing on:
a. The authority of the city to collect revenue for locally-determined
uses.
b. The effectiveness of municipal revenue collection.
c. The degree to which the city is financially dependent on the
national government and the amount of municipal control over the
use of national funds.
Provide preliminary suggestions on policy, legal, and institutional
changes which would allow the city to mobilize additional public reve-
nue. Also, suggest further studies needed to generate specific propo-
sals.
8. Analyze the city's land use problems, which may include: [AID selects
primary focus]
a. Availability of land for urban growth.
b. Availability of land for lower-income residential development.
c. Controlling the location and type of urban land development.
d. Loss of agricultural land to urban development.
Include in this analysis a brief review of land prices, development
standards, tenure, physical characteristics, and land use regulations.
Provide recommendations on subjects for further study.
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ANNEX 3
II. An Overview of the Methodology and Its Major Components
The basic structure of the NUPS methodology is presented in Figure I. The
framework for analysis shown in Figure I consists of five major components:
(1) An Aggregate Demographic and Economic Module (ADEM);
(2) A Settlement Allocation/Costing Module (SACM) with two major sub-
components: (a) Investment for Employment; and (b) Investment for
Shelter and Infrastructure;
(3) A Control, Feasibility and Risk Module (CFRM);
(4) An Evaluation of Strategic Alternatives Module (ESAM); and
(5) A "Preferred Strategy Recommendation Module" (PSRM).
Source: "Analytical Methodology for Preparing Urban Policy Reommendations,"
PADCO, Washington, January 1984.
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The following is a brief description of each of the modules.
A. The Aggregate Demographic and Economic Module (ADEM)
The ADEM provides estimates of total urban population and its change over a
given time period -- that is, an estimate of the population likely to need urban
jobs, shelter and services. It also provides estimates of the total investment
resource pool (i.e., the total investment generated by the economy which will be
available to finance different sectoral programs) over the planning period to
achieve a given rate of economic growth. This module provides sectoral detail on
the distribution of total investment among economic sectors.
The ADEM total urban population estimate is used as a control total in the
Settlement Allocation/Costing Module (SACM). The estimate of the total
resource pool is used as a control total in the Control/Feasibility/Risk Module
(CFRM). The sectoral costs per job are used as inputs to the !nvestment for
Employment sub-component of the SACM.
B. The Settlement Allocation and Costing Module (SACM)
The Settlement Allocation and Costing Module builds on the national population
and aggregate economic projections developed in the ADEM module. Specifically,
it allocates investment in employment and shelter and urban infrastructure at the
settlement level. As such, it consists of two subcomponents:
" The Investment for Employment Subcomponent, and
" The Investment for Shelter and Urban Infrastructure Subcomponent.
The two and their inter-relationships are discussed below.
1. Investment for Employment
The Investment for Employment sub-component of the SACM is
implemented once total urban population and sectoral costs per job are
calculated by the ADEM module. Here, investment is allocated among
the urban settlements to generate enough jobs to support the total urban
populations. This allocation procedure is one of the most innovative
elements of the NUPS methodology.
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The SACM provides the basis for establishing population targets by
settlement in each of the settlement alternatives to be tested.
Specifically, a functional relationship is established between the
employment growth rate of each settlement and investment costs per job.
Settlement population targets are determined by the rate of growth of
employment.
A variety of alternative distributions of population among urban areas can
be generated by changing the manner in which investment for job creation
is allocated. A given allocation determines simultaneously the expected
cost per job created for each settlement and the rate of employment
growth in the. settlement. Population growth in each settlement is then
derived from employment growth.
This sub-component of the SACM produces three analytic outputs that are used
later in the methodology:
* Population targets by settlement, which are used to estimate required
shelter and infrastructure levels and costs in the Investment for Shelter
and Infrastructure sub-component;
* Total employment and population, and
* Total direct investment in employment generation.
The settlement population targets provide the direct link in the methodology
between the Investment for Employment and Investment for Shelter and
Infrastructure sub-components of the SACM.
2. The Shelter/Infrastructure Component
The "Investment for Shelter/Infrastructure" component of the "Settlement
Allocation/Costing Module" takes the settlement population distributions
derived from the "Investment for Employment" subcomponent. It then
calculates the total and per capita costs of the shelter and urban
infrastructure needed to support the demand for these services created by
the population targets.
This step in the methodology requires a substantial amount of empirical
information about the stock, condition, and capacity of shelter and
infrastructure in the major settlements. The cost of future investment
plans will hinge on the degree to which existing stock can be used or
upgraded to handle projected population growth rather than adding new
capacity.
The implementation of the "Investment for Shelter/Infrastructure"
component provides information on the total and per capita costs of each
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alternative and additional information on the sensitivity of these costs to
future standards, prices, and demand. The aggregation of the costs from
it and the "Investment for Employment" subcomponents provides a means
of assessing the financial feasibility of alternatives when compared with
the estimated total resource pool (derived in the ADEM Macro-Module).
The sensitivity analysis provides a means of proposing alternative
standards, pricing, and cost recovery mechanisms to alter the projected
financial exposure resulting from the choice of any particular set of
population distribution targets. Finally, the empirical analysis, within a
sector, provides decision-makers with information needed to determine
which kinds of sectoral choices have the best chance of being cost-
effective elements of future development projects.
C. THE CONTROL/FEASIBILITY/RISK MODULE (CFRM)
The sectoral and total costs for the alternatives becomes the major input links
between the SACM and the financial feasibility element of the CFRM.
The employment and infrastructure costs resulting from the SAEM module are used
to establish whether or not a given settlement strategy is likely to, be affordable
within the investment resource pool. An alternative is judged to be more or less
risky depending upon the degree to which its implementation:
* Requires supplementation of domestic resources with foreign resources
(the danger of increased dependence or a foreign resource gap);
* Requires substantial shifts of resources from one sector to another, e.g.,
from agriculture to urban housing and infrastructure; or
* Requires more total resources than are likely to be generated from both
domestic and foreign sources at a feasible rate of economic growth.
The administrative/legal feasibility element of the CFRM relies less on
quantitative analysis than the other parts of the methodology. It relies heavily on
information developed on the current legal framework for urban development, the
administrative structure and practices, allocation of - decision making authority
among national ministries and between the national, governorate and local
authorities, as well as some of the empirical analysis described so far.
Places which will require substantial increases in the allocation of industrial,
shelter and infrastructure investments in order to reach population targets will
pose heavy requirements for planning, project identification and evaluation, as
well as management and supervision of project implementation. Thus alternatives
with high requirements for growth in areas where administrative support is lacking
pose the risk of being costly to implement because the management skills needed
-to implement those strategies may not be forthcoming.
98
Finally, alternatives that imply substantial redistribution of the urban population
may necessitate restructuring of administrative responsibilities and authority, the
possible creation of new institutions, and revised procedures for staffing in places
which receive priority attention.
D. THE EVALUATION OF STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES MODULE (ESAM)
This module is designed to provide an evaluation of the alternatives developed and
costed in the preceding analysis. Alternatives that turn out to be financially and
administratively feasible may differ considerably in the degree to which they
contribute to different national development objectives and in the relationship
between their expected beneficial results and costs. This portion of the
methodology, therefore, assesses in both quantitative and non-quantitative terms
the relative value of the alternatives in achieving national development objectives
and benefits relative to costs.
NUPS analysis, as well as urban policy analysis in other countries, has made it
clear that no single settlement strategy is simultaneously the best way of
achieving all of the multiple objectives of development policy.
The Government of Egypt, for example, had four major national objectives which
were likely to be more or less fully achieved depending upon the spatial and
sectoral strategy adopted. These were:
* Achievement of a high rate of national economic growth;
* The maintenance of social justice through inter-personal and inter-regional
equity;
* Reduction of the adverse consequences of population concentration in
Cairo; and
* Protection of arable land to contribute to the production of food and the
growth of agriculture-oriented industry.
The approach used in NUPS is to assess the relative value of the settlement
alternatives was to:
* To develop performance data (from the preceding analysis) for each
alternative and compare them;
* To estimate the quantitative income benefits of each alternative and the
net benefits (income benefits minus financial costs).
To peform this analysis, the ESAM module consists of two subcomponent, a non-
quantified ranking of alternatives according to the degree to which they meet
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development objectives and a quantification of the relative economic benefits and
costs of alternatives. The non-quantified ranking of alternatives is based on
establishing performance criteria on which an alternative is judged according to
how it ranks vis-a-vis other alternatives in meeting development objectives. The
quantification of economic benefits and costs shows the degree to which a
settlement alternative is likely to lead to national economic growth. An
alternative with low net benefits (i.e., the difference between total economic
bencfits and costs) is less likely to contribute to national economic growth than
one with higher net benefits.
1. Aggregate Economic Benefit/Cost Estimate
Any attempt to'quantitatively estimate aggregate benefits of all kinds and
costs of alternative national urban policies should be treated with
caution. This is true for many reasons, including the difficulty of
treating benefits on multiple criteria (such as both social, distributional
and economic) as if they were commensurable (i.e., subject to a common
set of measurements); and that the incidence of benefits and costs (i.e.,
who receives the benefits and who pays the costs) is often at least as
important as their overall magnitudes. That is why the overall benefits
described above were not aggregated into a single benefit measure.
Given these caveats, however, an important but limited set of
commensurable economic benefits and costs can be calculated to illustrate
aggregate economic benefits and costs associated with different urban
development alternatives. The primary purpose of these calculations is to
demonstrate the direction of effects on net benefits of moving from
relatively regionally concentrated strategies to an interregionally dispersed
strategy. Thus, the exact magnitude of the calculated benefit streams is
not as important as the relationship between the streams associated with
different strategies.
E. PREFERRED STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS
The final component of the methodology is the "Preferred ' Strategy"
recommendations. Ideally, the preferred strategy recommendations should grow
out of the analysis of previous modules whereby desirable elements of different
alternatives are combined into a single set of policy recommendations which can
be adopted by government. At the very least, the Preferred Strategy
recommendations should contain the following:
* Spatial priorities, population targets and investment costs across the
settlement system.
* Sectoral priorities standards, service levels investment costs and cost
recovery procedures, and
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e. Summary costs of the Preferred Strategy, performance characteristics,
benefit costs analysis showing its desirable characteristics and permitting
evaluation of the strategy as it is being implemented.
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NATIONAL URBAN POLICY STUDY
NUPS PERFORMANCE DATA:
POPULATION PARAMETERS YEAR 2000
TOTAL URBAN LARGE
TOTALURBAN
67.5 37.0 31.9
(in millions of innabitants)
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE.:
ANNUAL GDP GROWTH RATE 6.9 - 7.0%
1980: t r .27 200O- L.E.640 - 650 PER CAPITA GDP
TOTAL RESOURCE POOL : 105.8
(in F billinnsi
TOTAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT COSTS 101.1
(in L.E. billions)
*otal investment less agriculture and petroleum investment
pool
V'-
- - - IJlse..., I .LPy
....--- -- - 4 & --,t -~.
CCGT OMPARSON~ PREFERRED AS A PERCENTAGECCST PARI ON: 0O ~
of i of B of Bof C-
O:f 89 77t v yV
PERFORMANCE OF ALTERNATIVES :
- INVESTMENT SURPLUS OR DEFICIT VS. RESOURCE POOL
NUPS A . C
(in L.E. billions)
- JOB GROWTH SUPPORTABLE BY RESOURCE POOL
NUPS PREFERRED - C
6.3 5.
DIiFFERENCE FRQM '". -.
(in millions of jobs)
- NET ECONOMIC BENEFITS
CUMULATIVE CUMULATIVE NPTOC
1966-2000 PER CAPITA NUP5 TO 
C
NUPS C NUPS C CUM. ANNUAL
160.3 123.5 665.3 84.7 1.43 1.27
L.E. billions L.E. Per caoita
PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE :
LOCATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN POPULATION
I .00ti',I Of PER rh 7,
NP ARABLE URBAN ARABLE DESERT
ZOE LAND INFILL LAND SITEtin urban (some arable flow pro-
bouncariesi jare nn) rfurtivity)
GREATER
CAIR C 3*645,31
GREATEk
LEXANURIA 416 1,713 1,141
CANAL 459
DELTA 3,264
NORTH UPPER 838
EGYPT 838
SOUTH UPPER. 1,418 842EGYPT
REMCTE 2
AkEAS 249
TOTAL 4.53b 5.061 1.713 IC.006
F
I--- -- --
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NATIONAL URBAN POLICY STUDY
ARABLE LAND SAVINGS IN DELTA
UNDER THE PREFERRED STRATEGY
1976 1985 2000 ARABLE LAND
URBAN URBAN URBAN CONSUMED ----h
POPU- POPU- POPU-
LATION LATION LATION
(00'sl 7,0's) ( 000 T1[hectares)(Feddans)
Arable lana 3,668 5,023 8,014 !20,079 i47806 - .. y A"
loss 4f trend -,2 ,1.....,0
population
growtn occurs 1
NUPS Preferred
Strategy
Land loss if 3,668 5.023 6,952 15,172 .36,124 1 1 V1 a c.IT T density patterns 1-
observed-
through Landsat
analysis occur L
Land loss if -
NUPS recon- -
wended censities
are acnieved 3/ -
(1976-1985) 3.668 5,023 E,260 14,905 t .D -1 -1. a - S T T A ( - )q1J
(1986-2000) 5,023 6,952 92E 2,204 -
TOTALS 7,186 .17,109 v - -
SAVINCS OF
APABL. LA - 12,93 .30.697 - 9 )
1/ Poulatiors pro ected using growth rates experienced - ...
between 1960 and 1976.
2/ Land consumption based on rates of arable land consumed - -I
in belta settlements between 1972 and 1976 noted from I ' A
Lancsat analysis (i.e., roughly 11 feadans consumed
per 1,000 additional urban population).
3/ Land consumction assumes that trends noted ir footnote 2/ -A 4=-J
aoove will continue up until 19t! after that time it
is assumec that a program to encourage vertical expansion - a r I&
cf existing built areas car. atsorb 60 percent of the new - o I-- 
urban pooulatior and that the rerraining 40 percent will -- -- )
be accommodated in planned settlements having urban e--:
gross densities of 350 persons per hectare (147 persons -
per teodar.). See NUPS Tanta Illustrative Project
keport Table A.5 for a full ar.alysis of this assumption. -
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NATIONAL URBAN POLICY STUDY
ARABLE LAND SAVINGS IN DELTA
UNDER THE PREFERRED STRATEGY -
1976 1985 2000 ARABLE LAND4 ,{
URBAN URBAN URBAN CONSUMED
POPU- POPU- POPU-
LATION LATION LATION
(000's) 9,00's) (000 '1 (hectares)(Feddans)
Arable land 3,668 5,023 8,014 20,079 147,806 2 y1 - ..yt A t 0' ' I I&Vloss if trend-
population
growth occurs 1;
A1 -
NUPS Preferred
Strategy
I I.l 
-
Land loss if 3,668 5.023 6,952 15,172 .36,124 1 T . T 'T VI A
density patterns .uI
observed
throuch LanCsat
analysis occur
11.2 Ia'*.JI-i
Land loss if
NL'FS recort- I I
menoed aensities
are achieved -
(1976-1985 3.668 5,023 6.260 14,9C5 t1 6 6. b - U i ( 4k*- 9 '%
(1966-2000) 5,023 6.952 926 2,204 % - I a . ( c... - n )
TOTALS 7.186 17,109 y I 
-
SAVINCS CF
APABLi LANDb 12,93 .30,697 I -- i )
1/ Porulatiors pro3ected using growth rates experienced -%.1.,<.. j.;..1 .1
between 1960 and 1976.
2/ Land consumption based on rates of arable land consumed r -'
in DIelta settlements between 1972 and 1976 noted from -.
Lancsat aralysis (i.e., rouqhly 11 feddans consumed j
per 1,000 additional urban population).
3/ Land consunction asstmes that trends noted ir footnote 2/ - - .y
above will continue up until 19'. after that time it
is assumed that a program to encourage vertical expansion
cf existing built areas car atsort, 60 percent of the new - '*-
urtban polulation and that thie reraining 40 percent will . -... - -- -------- *)--- -
be accommodated in planned settlements having urban . ( .;,...., e ) -
gross censities of !50 persons per hectare (147 persons
per teaar.;. See NUPS Tanta Illustrative Froject
kepnr t Table A.5 for a full analysis of this assumption.
106
TABLE 1-2
PREFERRED STRATEGY - DIRECT INVESTMENT COSTS, ZONE TOTALS
(L.E. MILLIONS)
1986 - 1990
AMOUNT PERCENTAGE
4,572 52.7
1,538 17.7
1991 - 1995
AMOUNT PERCENTAGE
6,906 53.1
2,409 18.6
1996 - 2000
AMOUNT PERCENTAGE
11,892 53.0
4,296 19.2
TOTAL
1986 - 2000
AMOUNT PERCENTAGE
23,370 53.0
8,243 18.7
Delta
North Upper Egypt
South Upper Egypt
Canal
Remote
830 9.6
280 3.2
684 7.9
672 7.7
113 1.3
1,112 8.6
364 2.8
1,761 7.9 3,703
588 2.6 1,232
975 7.5 1,595 7.1 3,254
1,061 8.2 1,971 8.8 3,704
157 1.2 318 1.4
8.4
2.8
7.4
8.4
588 1.3
8,689 100 12,984 100 22,421 100 44,094 100
Direct investment costs are for gross investment in mining, manufacturing, construction, and
services industries. They are, therefore, Job creation and contribution investments.
SOURCE: NUPS Estimates.
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ZONE
Cairo
Alexandria
TOTAL
TABLE 1-3
KEY FEATURES OF THE PREFERRED STRATEGY
1986-2000 AVERAGE
EMPLOYMENT COST TOTAL COST SHARE OF
2000 POPULATION CHANGE PER JOB (L.E. INVESTMENT POPULATION
ZONE (000) (000) (L.E.) MILLION) (W) INCREASE
Cairo 16,500 3,653 6,397 23,370 53.0 53.9
Alexandria 5,500 1,327 6,216 8,243 18.7 19.5
Delta 4,470 597 6,203 3,703 8.4 8.9
North Upper Egypt 990 172 7,163 1,232 2.8 2.5
South Upper Egypt 2,030 436 7,463 3,254 7.4 6.4
Canal 2,000 523 7,082 3,704 8.4 7.6
Remote 400 81 7,2591 588 1.3 1.2
TOTAL 31,890 6,789 6,495 44,094 100 100
1 These figures are considerably below the average costs per job In the Northwest Coast Plan, the
Red Sea Governorate Regional Plan and the Sinai Development Study. They could only be kept at
these low levels by financing only high payoff projects. The costs per job in the Sinai, Red Sea
Governorate and Northwest Coast Plans are 57,032; 93,700; and 26,700, respectively.
SOURCE: NUPS Estimates.
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TABLE 1-8
COMPARISON OF BENEFIT AND COSTS
(Large Urban Areas Over 50,000 Plus Remote Areas)
Avercage 1986-20(X) Intro-I rbon Direct
Annuol lotal Garowth Cost-Infro- Investment F I Aver'wie
IQ86-2000 Income Income Maniement struc ture Job Urbon Annual I ket Het Benefits Net of Inter-
PoulIaIion ienefit IN'ne fits Cost ((;MC) l1,1s CWC Crention Infi.lts Benefits Urbon Infrastructure Costs"
Chonge Capito (L.E. (L.r. (L.E. (L.E. (L.- . Per Capito Total Per Capito
(Thousands) (IL.E.) Millions) Millions) Millions Millions) Millions (L.E.) (L.F.Millions) (L.E. Millions)
Preferred Strategy
Cairo Region 6.793 1,264 128,758 4,618 21.994 23,370 83,314 818 98,687 521
Alexandria Region 2,458 1.130 41,649 1,762 9.835 8,243 23.571 639
Canal 969 916 13.311 856 4,504 3.704 5.103 351
Delta 1.123 863 14.531 464 7.043 3.703 1,765 22'#
f lor th t ipper Fqvp t 322 8.2 4.X4,1 195 2.506 1.212 110 67
South Upper Egypt 809 859 10.419 657 2,515 3.254 4s.6511 383
Remote 149 753 1.682 235 1,704 S88 -61( -273
Totals 12,623 1.132 214,418 8,787 50.121 44,094 121.201 635
Alternative A
Cairo Region 6.712 1.263 127. 13 4,777 20.456 23,909 82.819 873 100,725 540
Alexandria Region 2.736 1.133 46,508 2,095 12,039 9.217 75.252 615
Canal 546 899 7.360 307 2.799 % 1,902 2.659 325
Delta 1.888 865 24.489 1,110 9,552 6,154 8,583 303
tor th Ipper Egypt 181 815 2.267 71 1,746 682 -161 -59
South Upper Egypt 355 834 4.443 ISO 1,593 1,309 1.541 289
Remote 19 854 243 25 797 165 -719 -2,523
Totals 12,437 1,139 212,493 8.535 48,982 43,538 119,973 643
Alternative C
Cairo Region 5,293 1,256 99:736 3,212 16.441 18,422 64.873 817 54,119 291
Alexandria Region 1,358 1.114 22,695 596 6,438 4,104 12,153 597
Canal 1,133 919 15.619 1,331 9.676 4,326 1,617 95
Delia 1,539 856 19.755 812 I1,436 5,230 3,089 134
lorth Upper Egypt 731 858 9.407 739 6,580 2,912 -85 -8
South Upper Egypt 1,299 858 16,728 1,338 6,303 5,152 5.273 271
Remote 1,049 952 14,987 5,009 16,964 6,070 -8.047 -511
Totals 12.402 1.069 198,927 13,037 73,838 46,216 78,869 423
Joles:
Column I: Fron NUPS estimates of zone population in 2000 minus 1985 popitation.
Column 2: Colculoted on basis of 1992-3 population, by settlement, using the relationship Incorne Per Capito = a (population) where a 976.97,
Populatin in Millions.
Column 3: Calculated as Column 2 times Column I times 15 years.
Column 4: Calculoted as difference between average cost per job limes chanqe in jobs at settlement arowth rates specified in the strategy and average cost
at zero growth times change in jobs.
Column 5: Sum of growth mmagrxiemient cost aid intra-mrinn infrostructure cost.
Colunn 6: Total direct investment cost in job creation.
Column 7: - Column 3 mintis the somfil of Columns 5 ond 6.
Column 8: Calculaed as Column 7 divided by Colimn I times IS years.
The inclusion of int er-reqional infrastructure costs reduces total benefits shown In Columns 7 and 8 to the liqumes shown.
TABLE 1-10
SUMMARY OF COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Annual Average Net
intra-Urban Annual Benefits with Inter-
Average Net Benefits Urban infrastructure
Per Capita included
As Percent As Percent
SETTLEMENT Total of Preferred Total of Preferred
A LTERNtATI vE (L.E.) (f) (LE.f)
Fref erred Strateqy 635 100 521 100
Alternative A 643 101 540 104
Alternatice C 423 67 291 56
SOURCE: NUPS analysis.
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TABLE 11-1
POPULATION OF THE SETTLEMENT ALTERNATIVES
POPULATION (IN THOUSANDS)
1990
ANNUAL
GROWTH RATE(5)
1985 - 1990
A 1 8 82 B2 C A B, 8I 82 B2 C
EFFICIENCY EQUITY EFFICIENCY EQUITY EFFICIENCY EQUITY EFFICIENCY EQUITY
Cairo 11,457 11,066 11,066 11.115 11,115 11,029 3.8 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.0
Alexandria 3,809 3,867 3,637 3,440 3,440 3,440 4.6 4.9 3.6 2.5 2.5 2.5
Delta 3,857 3,728 3,739 3,771 3,767 3,767 2.9 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4
Canal 1,187 1,624 1,624 1,483 1,412 1,382 2.7 9.3 9.3 7.3 6.3 5.8
North Upper Egypt 716 727 799 879 902 412 1.4 1.7 3.7 5.6 6.2 6.4
South Upper Egypt 1,322 1,342 1,460 1,613 1,657 1,668 1.6 1.9 3.7 5.7 6.3 6.4
Renkte 238 239 271 291 308 405 1.0 1.0 3.6 5.1 6.3 12.3
TOTAL 22,586 22,593 22,596 22,592 22,601 22,603
1995 1990 - 1995
Cajro 13,750 12,899 12,899 12,998 12,998 12,862 3.7 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1
Alexandria 4,727 4,640 4,190 3,890 3,890 3,914 4.4 3.7 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.6
De lts 4,466 4,250 4,253 4,355 4,347 4,283 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.6
Canal 1,368 2,550 2,550 2,002 1,850 1,761 2.9 9.4 9.4 6.2 5.6 5.0
North Upper Egypt 780 767 913 1,113 1,167 1,149 1.7 1.1 2.7 4.8 5.3 4.7
Romote 254 249 311 361 402 724 1.3 0.8 2.8 4.4 5.5 12.3
TOIAL 26,785 26,781 26,778 26,762 26,781 26,782
2000 1995 - 2000
Cairo 16,419 14,999 15,001 15,200 15,200 15,000 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1
Alexandria 5,778 5,258 4,630 4,400 4,400 4,399 4.1 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.4
Delta 5,175 4,864 4,869 5,111 5,113 4,861 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.3 2.6
North Upper Egypt 849 795 9,899 1,374 1,456 1,398 1.8 0.8 1.8 4.3 4.5 4.0
South Upper Egypt 1,581 1,482 1,813 2,526 2,639 2,525 1.9 0.8 1.8 4.3 4.4 3.9
Canal 1,577 3,999 3,9)9 2,596 2,342 2,165 2.9 9.4 9.4 5.3 4.8 4.2
Remote 270 253 341 438 502 1,300 1.2 0.3 1.9 3.9 4.6 12.4
TOTAL 31,649 31,650 31,652 31,645 31,652 31,648
SOCF: NIPS anal ysis.
TABLE 1L-2
SUMMARY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT COSTS 1986-2000
(L.E. Millions)
NUPS
SECCOR A 81 EFFICIENCY BI EQUITY B2 EFFICIENCY B2 EQUITY C PREFERRED
STRATEGY2
1986-1990
INDUSTRY 8,423 8,891 9,030 9,134 9,929 9,531 8,689
URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE 12,429 13,728 15,528 14,646 16,226 17,803 10,078
INTER-URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE 4,883 5,117 5,280 5,192 5,279 6,071 5,071
TOTAL 25,735 27,736 29,838 28,972 30,784 33,405 23,838
1991-1995
INDUSTRY 12,826 13,493 13,598 13,236 13,360 13,620 12,984
FBAN INFRASTRUCTURE 13,200 16,394 17,129 15,474 17,551 21,884 10,023
INTER-LBAN INFRASTRUCTURE 6,375 6,016 3,877 7,199 5,949 8,212 8,891
TOTAL 32,401 35,903 37,604 35,909 36,860 43,716 31,898
1996-2000
INDUSTRY 22,247 23,010 23,157 22,268 22,475 23,051 22,421
UPBAN INFRASTRUCTURE 14,818 18,357 19,523 17,469 19,675 23,127 11,324
INTER-URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE 7,990 8,285 8,496 9,044 9,136 10,468 11,702
TOTAL 45,055 49,652 51,176 48,781 51,286 56,646 45,447
1986-2000
INDUSTRY 43,496 45,394 45,785 44,638 45,074 46,202 44,094
WUBAN INFRASTRUCTURE 40,447 48,479 52,180 47,589 53,492 60,441 31,425
INTER-UE3AN INFRASTRUCTURE 19,248 19,418 20,653 21,435 20,364 24,751 _25464
TOTAL 103,191 113,291 118,618 113,662 118,930 131,394 101,182
The methodology for estimating direct Investment costs In Industry is described In Appendix Ii.C.
2 Includes telecommunications in urban Infrastructure othor standards similar to Estimate I.
SOURCE: NUPS analysis.
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TABLE 11-3
EVALUATION SUMMARY
AVERAGE SCORES AND AVERAGE RANKS 1
A BI EFFICIENCY B1 EQUITY
EVALUATION
CRITERION2
1. Social
Effectiveness
2. Economic
Efficiency
3.. Management &
Implementation
4. Risk
5. Cost 3
B2 EFFICIENCY B2 EQUITY C
Av. Av. Av. Av. Av. Av. Av. Av. Av. Av. Av. Av.
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank
4.0 3.0 5.1 3.5 4.8 3.3 4.1 2.8 4.4 3.3 5.9 4.8
2.1 1.5 3.1 2.2 4.7 3.4 4.6 3.2 6.7 4.6 8.6 6.0
2.2 1.7 4.5 3.5 5.5 4.0 4.1 2.8 5.2 3.6 8.2
3.2 2.1
- 0.1
5.7
4.4 2.4 5.3 3.5 4.8 3.0 6.2 4.2 8.3 5.3
- 2.0 - 4.0 - 3.0 5.0 6.0
Numerical values are shown to help provide a sensE
judged by NUPS professional staff. Judgments of
-weIghted differentiy than the equal deighIng' used
nical or scientific basis for adopting particular
of the relative dIfferences among alternatives as
others may differ or Individual criteria may
to d-eriv 'the'averae values. Ther'e ls-no
weigning system. Average scores and average
are both shown in this table. In the procecure used an alternative could be assigned a score of 1 to
10, with a score of 1 best and 10 worst. The numerical values of the scores are a rough guide to not
only which alternatives rank highest but how great the dlfterences are among them. The average rank
Is simply the sum of the' ranksassIbned b al' ev6ilatI*'n''sfaff dIvidec by thei'r number.
2 See complete list of sub-criteria under each of tnese general headings In Appendix II-B.
These ranks are derived from cost estimates rather than the evaluation procedure described in foot-
note 1.
SOURCE: NUPS analysis.
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